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RIGHTS HELD HOSTAGE: RACE, IDEOLOGY AND
THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Kenneth B. Nunn*
Prologue
In the spring of 1991, a gang of baton-wielding Los Angeles
police officers savagely beat motorist Rodney King at the inter-
section of Foothill Boulevard and Osborne Street.' By a quirk of
fate, a bystander captured the assault on videotape and, within
days, much of the nation became witness to the excesses of the
Los Angeles Police Department. 2 Most Americans reacted with
shock and outrage3 to this apparent police rampage and the De-
partment's subsequent cover-up attempt.4 Yet, thirteen months
later, a jury of ten whites, one Latino and one Asian-American
returned verdicts of acquittal on ten of the eleven charges filed
against the officers. 5
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. A.B., 1980,
Stanford University; J.D., 1984, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall). I would like to thank John Calmore, Nancy Dowd, Neil Gotanda, Dwight Greene,
Linda Greene, Sheri Johnson, Toni Massaro, Patricia Hilliard Nunn, Don Peters, Sharon
Rush and Christopher Slobogin for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
Colleen Stacy McMillen, Russell Beyer and Robert Thornhill IT[ provided able research
assistance. I would also like to thank my editors at the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
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I Police struck Mr. King at least 56 times with batons and kicked him a minimum of 6
times. Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department 7
(1991) [hereinafter Christopher Commission Report]. As a result of these blows, King
suffered fractured bones in his cheek, skull and ankle; a severe concussion; facial nerve
damage; and numerous cuts, contusions and abrasions. John G. Dunne, Law & Disorder
in Los Angeles, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Oct. 10, 1991, at 23, 24.
2 George Holiday videotaped the assault and sold the tape to Los Angeles television
station KTLA. The footage was picked up by the major television networks and broadcast
around the country. Dunne, supra note 1, at 24.
1 See, e.g., Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence, A.B.A. J., July 1991, at 45.
4 Police reports of the incident claimed that King attacked officers, resisted arrest, and
suffered only minor injuries before he was ultimately "subdued by several [officers] using
the swarm technique." These claims were later found to be untrue. Christopher Commission
Report, supra note 1, at 9.
5 Although over 20 police officers were on the scene when Mr. King was attacked,
only 4, Stacey Koon, Laurence Powell, Timothy Wind, and Theodore Briseno, were
ultimately charged with any crime. Richard A. Serrano & Ronald L. Soble, Grand Jury
Widens Probe of King Beating, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at Al, A22. Each of the four
was charged with three felony counts-assault with a deadly weapon, filing a false police
report, and accessory after the fact to a felony-and one misdemeanor, excessive use of
force as a police officer. Amended Indictment, People v. Powell, et. al., Cal. Super. Ct.
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The verdicts were immediately attacked as racist 6 (King is
Black, his attackers were white), 7 and some jurors, who requested
anonymity, lent credence to this assessment by their post-trial
comments. Echoing a theory proffered by the defense,8 one juror
stated that Rodney King "was in full control" of the situation, 9
even as he absorbed more than fifty blows from police officers
armed with service revolvers, batons and Tasers. Such an expla-
nation (for the jury's leniency) recalls the racist stereotype of the
"Black savage." 10 It transforms Rodney King into a wild and fe-
for L.A. Cty. No. BA-035498. The jury returned verdicts of acquittal on all counts except
for the excessive use of force charge against Officer Powell, on which the jury was unable
to reach a decision. Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, A8 [hereinafter Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen
Acquitted].
6 Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted, supra note 5, at Al.
71 use "Black" and "African-American" interchangeably throughout this Article to
refer to American citizens of African descent. "Black" denotes racial and cultural identity
rather than mere physical appearance and is therefore capitalized. The word "white," on
the other hand, is not capitalized because it is not ordinarily used in this sense. See Joan
Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and Cultural Preservation, 59 UMKC
L. REV. 487, n.1 ("'white'. . . denotes a number of separate ethnic or cultural groups").
Some commentators have offered a political rationale for the capitalization of terms de-
scribing people of African descent, arguing that the use of lower case terms to describe
Blacks indicates their lower status vis-A-vis other ethnic groups whose descriptors are
capitalized. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331,
1332 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment]; Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of"Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12 (1991) [hereinafter
Gotanda, Color-Blind].
8 The officers' defense team argued that Mr. King posed a continuing threat to the
officers and that the officers used only what force was necessary to take King into custody
without harm to themselves. One defense attorney argued, "The circumstances [of the
King incident] were consistent with the job [Timothy Wind] was hired to do. He was part
of the line between society and chaos." Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted, supra
note 5, at A8. Another attorney added that Officer Powell's batonwork was justified because
he was not "paid to roll around in the dirt with the likes of Rodney Glenn King." People
v. Powell, et. al., Cal. Super. Ct. for L.A. Cty., No. BA-035498 (Closing Argument for
Defendant Laurence M. Powell by Attorney Michael Stone) 3.
9 Lee A. Daniels, Some of the Jurors Speak, Giving Sharply Differing Views, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 1, 1992, at Al0. This particular juror expressed the belief that "Rodney King
was not being abused. Rodney King was directing the action .... [A]s long as he fought
the patrolman, the policemen had to continue to try to maintain him, to keep from having
more erratic felonious actions." Id.
10 One of the central myths about people of African descent is the characterization of
them as vicious, savage and animalistic. Conscious and unconscious racists use this ste-
reotype to reduce African-Americans to subhuman status and to justify treating them as
lesser beings. Psychiatrists Price Cobbs and William Grier, in their landmark book Black
Rage, claim this stereotype has ensconced itself in American culture as the myth of the
"bad n-r ." They write:
Today black boys are admonished not to be a "bad nigger." No description need
be offered; every black child knows what is meant. They are angry and hostile.
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rocious Black "buck" who, like his counterpart in Hollywood
fantasy," could somehow threaten life, limb and property while
lying prone and surrounded by more than two dozen of Los An-
geles' finest.
Yet the Rodney King verdict teaches more than the power of
racial stereotypes over a particular jury, and more even than the
enduring influence of racist images in American society. The King
case is a textbook example of the use of the criminal justice system
to subjugate African-Americans. The decision permitted the at-
tackers of a member of the African-American community to go
unpunished. 2 Moreover, the verdict validated the attack against
King, declaring open season on Blacks who happen to be stopped
by the police. Juries in criminal cases do not merely determine
facts; they grant or withhold social approbation for defendants'
behavior. In the Rodney King case, where a videotape left so
many facts undisputed, the jury's most significant action was its
decision to place the stamp of approval on the use of brutal force
against "unruly" Blacks. The predominantly Black residents of
They strike fear into everyone with their uncompromising rejection of restraint or
inhibition. They may seem at one moment meek and compromised-and in the
next a terrifying killer.
WILLIAM GRIER & PRICE COBBS, BLACK RAGE 65 (1968). Later, the psychiatrists note the
psychological effects of this popular myth. They state that:
Cultural stereotypes of the savage rapist-Negro express the fear that the black
man will turn on his tormentors. Negro organizations dread the presence of the
bad nigger. White merchants who have contact with black people have uneasy
feelings when they see a tight mouth, a hard look, and an angry black face. The
bad nigger in black men no doubt accounts for more worry in both races than any
other single factor.
Id. at 66. See also WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 25-28, 114 (1968) (noting that
fascination and fear of purported Black savagery began with first contact between the races
and continued into the slavery era, fueled by the fear of slave insurrections); ANDREW
HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 13 (1992)
[hereinafter HACKER, Two NATIONS] (arguing that the stigma of "the savage" prevents
African-Americans from gaining full acceptance in American society).
"1 American films have depicted and frequently continue to depict African-American
males in this way. See DONALD BOGLE, ToMs, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMMIES & BUCKS:
AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN FILM 13 (2d ed. 1989) (describing
the stereotypical Hollywood "buck" as a "big, baadddd nigger[ ], oversexed and savage,
violent and frenzied").
12 This subjugates the Black community in part because punishment can be seen as
morally and psychologically compensatory for the physical and psychic harm done to King
and his family, friends and community. Failing to impose punishment, then, both deprives
those victimized by the beating of retribution, and legitimates ideological judgments as to
the lack of worth of African-Americans. See sources cited at supra note 10.
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South Central Los Angeles received this message loud and clear,
and registered their disapproval in a fit of self-destructive anger
and despair within hours after the jury announced its decision. 3
Much of the commentary on the Rodney King verdict and its
aftermath has focused on the decision to change the trial's venue. 14
But what if Mr. King's car had come to a stop in Simi Valley and
no venue change had been possible?15 What if there had been no
George Holliday present to videotape the assault and the Rodney
King incident had remained a garden variety resisting arrest case? 16
Is there any doubt what the outcome would have been if the trial
went before the same jury that heard the charges against Officers
Briseno, Wind, Powell and Koon?
Rather than concentrating on venue, critics of the Rodney
King decision might better focus on the jury selection process
itself. For perhaps the most pressing question about the verdict is
this: in a case so clearly implicating racism, why were there no
Blacks on the jury? Whether Blacks were excluded "intentionally,"
or whether their underrepresentation was a simple matter of demo-
graphics, their absence from the jury casts a shadow over the
verdict, a shadow lengthened by the history of discrimination
against African-Americans in this country. Given that Mr. King
would probably have been the one on trial in the absence of a
videotape, a thorough investigation of the jury selection process
should concentrate particularly on the impact of juror bias on
Black defendants. When juror bias leads to the unjust conviction
of Black defendants1 7 or the unjust acquittal of whites who practice
violence on Blacks, the criminal justice system becomes a mech-
anism for unjust social control. 8 A race-conscious approach to
13 Seth Mydans, 11 Dead in Los Angeles Rioting; 4,000 Guard Troops Called Out as
Fires and Looting Continue: Vandals Roam City, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al.
14 See, e.g., Raymond Brown, "It's Just Not Right": Reflections on Rodney King and
His Case, THE CHAMPION, July 1992, at 30.
,- In California, initial venue for a criminal prosecution is determined by reference to
the county in which the crime took place. Cal. Penal Code § 777 (West 1985).
16 King was initially charged with evading arrest in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 69
(West 1988). Christopher Commission Report, supra note 1, at 8. He was released after
four days when the prosecutor determined that not enough evidence existed to prosecute
him on the charge.
17 By "unjust convictions" I mean to adopt Sheri Lynn Johnson's definition embracing
"totally blameless convicted defendants, the criminally culpable defendant guilty of a lesser
offense than the offense of which he is convicted, and the factually guilty but legally not
guilty convicted defendant." Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83
MIcH. L. REv. 1611, 1616 (1985) [hereinafter Johnson, Black Innocence].
"I Most egregiously, for example, law enforcement officials can accomplish this control
by isolating activists or detaining members of a racial group en masse.
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jury selection in criminal trials is required to end this form of
racially targeted oppression.
Introduction
This Article addresses the Supreme Court's application of the
Equal Protection Clause to the selection of juries in criminal trials.
Focusing on Black-white relations, it takes the position that efforts
to eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection are successful
only to the extent that they also eliminate the result of the discrim-
ination-racial subjugation of Blacks through the criminal justice
process. By this measure, the Supreme Court's recent jury selec-
tion cases are an abject failure.
The Court's application of colorblind principles to jury selec-
tion does little to improve the Equal Protection rights of Black
defendants or excluded Black jurors, and even less to enhance the
sorry state of race relations in this country. In recent jury selection
cases, the Court has abandoned its earlier efforts to instill sub-
stantive racial equality in the jury trial of criminal defendants.
Instead, it has embraced a surface, ultimately non-neutral, process
neutrality in the selection of jurors. By adopting colorblind rhetoric
and insisting that any rights or privileges extended to Blacks also
be extended to whites, the Court hampers its ability to shape
remedies that address courtroom discrimination particular to Af-
rican-Americans.
The Court's recent race-neutral approach effects a radical
transformation of its own jurisprudence in the jury selection area.
In prior jury selection cases interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court purposefully constructed race-conscious reme-
dies to prevent racially motivated convictions. As a threshold
matter, the Court required the defendant to be a member of the
racial or ethnic group that was excluded from jury service in order
to raise an Equal Protection claim. 19 Specifically, the Court re-
quired such racial identity between the defendant and excluded
venirepersons in cases alleging the prosecution's discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges.20 The Court held that a prima facie
case of discrimination was established when, in cases involving a
'9 See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Black defendant, all Blacks were excluded from the pool of poten-
tial jurors despite the availability of eligible Blacks in the popula-
tion at large. 21 The Court did not adopt these race-conscious ap-
proaches haphazardly. Rather, it recognized the need for
affirmative efforts to protect the Equal Protection rights of Black
defendants and to neutralize the use of the jury selection process
as an explicit means of racial subjugation.22
The pragmatic color-consciousness of the Supreme Court's
jury selection jurisprudence stood in sharp contrast to the disin-
genuously utopian colorblind analysis 23 that the Supreme Court
has applied in other Equal Protection Clause contexts. 24 In these
other cases, the Supreme Court has focused consistently on elim-
inating what it perceives as "undeserved" Black rights rather than
fashioning remedies that recognize the gross disparities between
conditions for Blacks and whites in this country.25 The Court has
demonstrated a misguided concern with equalizing the rights and
privileges available to both races, in complete disregard for the
goal of achieving substantive equality in results.
In Powers v. Ohio,26 the Court applied its new colorblind
standard to the jury selection area. Powers permitted white defen-
dants to avail themselves of Batson rights 27 to contest the racially
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors.
By doing so, the Court, in true colorblind fashion, shifted its
attention from equality of result to equality of process. The color-
blind standard used by the Court ignores the central reality of
racial oppression in America-that the preeminent form of racism
is white racism.28 It fails to acknowledge that white defendants,
21 Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
2 By "explicit means" I am referring to the fact that the Court has not permitted the
intentional exclusion of Blacks from jury service. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. The
Court has stopped short of adopting a disparate impact test for proving discrimination in
the selection of juries.
2 See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). See generally Linda
Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1515 (1990)
[hereinafter Greene, Race in the 21st Century].
21 This aspect of the Court's recent civil rights decisions is discussed infra notes 38-
63 and accompanying text.
6 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
27 See infra notes 138-154 and accompanying text.
2 By "white racism" I mean all conduct that privileges white interests over Black,
whether conscious or unconscious, intentional or unintentional, individual or institutional,
overt or covert.
[Vol. 28
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though concerned only with avoiding convictions, now have li-
cense from the Court to appropriate the banner of racial equality
for their own parochial purposes.
Powers was followed closely by Georgia v. McCollum, 2
9
which prevented white defendants from using their peremptory
challenges to intentionally exclude Black jurors. While the result
immediately reached in McCollum does not harm Black interests,
its holding, applied under the colorblind analysis adopted in Pow-
ers, could prevent Black defendants from using their peremptory
challenges to remove white jurors suspected of racism. Such prac-
tice would reinforce the use of the criminal justice system by
whites as an instrument of racial subjugation.
This Article argues that colorblindness, as applied by the
Supreme Court, is a form of racial politics that privileges white
interests over Black. Part I defines colorblindness, exploring its
meaning as general ideology and social theory, then examines the
parameters and effects of colorblind judicial philosophy.
Part II describes how, prior to Powers, race-consciousness
influenced the Supreme Court's jury selection jurisprudence.
Part III critiques the Supreme Court's holdings in Powers and
McCollum, exploring the Court's liberal use of colorblind rhetoric.
Part III also explains how the Court, deviating from its prior
doctrine, extended third party standing to white defendants-thus
granting white defendants rights previously created for Black de-
fendants-in an attempt to impose symmetry on the criminal jury
selection process.
Part IV offers a counter-narrative to the Powers/McCollum
conclusion that both Black and white criminal defendants should
have the same prerogatives in selecting juries. This counter-nar-
rative explores how whites and Blacks are situated differently with
respect to jury discrimination and catalogues the harms that
Blacks-particularly Black defendants-suffer as a result of that
discrimination. Part IV argues that the shift in focus from how the
criminal justice system may contribute to the subjugation of
Blacks, to how defendants as a class are treated by the criminal
process, brings political gains for the white majority and concrete
negative consequences for African-Americans.
Finally, Part V concludes that in order to diminish the sub-
jugation of African-Americans via the criminal process, the per-
- 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
1993]
70 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 28
emptory challenge of Black venirepersons should be prohibited
whenever there is a substantial likelihood that racial issues would
impact the trial.
I. Colorblindness
Colorblindness, a social theory that proclaims that race should
have no bearing on how an individual is treated,30 posits a world
where all will be treated equally and race prejudice will wither
away. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous I Have a Dream speech
may be the quintessential expression of a colorblind view of so-
ciety, a vision of a world in which people are judged by the
"content of their character" rather than the color of their skin. 31
30 As I use the term here, "colorblindness" is analogous to such concepts as: "formal
equality," D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45
VAND. L. REv. 349, 379 (1992) ("[T]he formal equality model of discrimination seeks to
remove discrimination from its setting within broad historical and social patterns... and
confine it to the narrow world of legal forms and classical legal values."); "formal equal
opportunity," Roy Brooks, Racial Subordination Through Formal Equal Opportunity, 25
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 881, 886, 896 (1988) [hereinafter Brooks, Racial Subordination] (de-
scribing "formal equal opportunity" as a civil rights policy providing "a legalistic, formalistic
type of equality"); "formal-race," Gotanda, Color-Blind, supra note 7, at 4 ("formal-race
... refers to socially constructed formal categories" of racial divisions which are "uncon-
nected to social attributes such as culture . . ."); and "racial non-recognition," id. at 6
(defining this term as the "recognition of racial affiliation followed by the deliberate suppres-
sion of racial considerations"). All of these expressions describe an analytic formalism that
factors race out of law. See, e.g., id. at 17 (arguing that racial non-recognition "permits a
court to describe, to accommodate, and then to ignore issues of subordination").
In A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991) [hereinafter
Aleinikoff, Race-Consciousness], T. Alexander Aleinikoff contends that there are two kinds
of colorblindness, weak and strong, and that race is irrelevant only under the strong variety.
"Weak colorblindness," on the other hand, "would not outlaw all recognition of race, but
would condemn the use of race as a basis for the distribution of scarce resources or
opportunities." Id. at 1079.
There is a growing body of literature, focusing principally on the areas of affirmative
action and employment discrimination law, that critiques the judiciary's adaptation of
colorblind principles to interpret the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Race-
Consciousness, supra; Brooks, Racial Subordination, supra; Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordi-
nation Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986);
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 7; Richard Delgado, Recasting
the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1389 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Race
Problem]; Gotanda, Color-Blind, supra note 7; Greene, Race in the 21st Century, supra
note 24; Donald Lively, Equal Protection and Moral Circumstance: Accounting for Con-
stitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 485 (1991) [hereinafter Lively, Equal Protection];
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 [hereinafter Peller, Race Conscious-
ness]; David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99; Eric Schnap-
per, Affirmative Action & the Legislative History of the 14th Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV.
753 (1985).
31 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS
OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 219 (James Washington ed., 1986). While King ultimately
dreamed of a colorblind society, he strongly advocated race-conscious affirmative action
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During the early years of the civil rights struggle, African-
Americans often embraced colorblindness as a means of eliminat-
ing the oppressed status of Blacks in the United States. 32 Since
their lived experience was one of unequal treatment on the grounds
of racial difference, 33 the prospect of a world where all would be
treated equally, at least in theory, was a considerable
improvement. 34
Colorblindness, however, is thought to offer more than just a
practical means of resolving the nation's racial problems. It has a
moral dimension as well 35 and it is often associated with univer-
measures as a means to achieving this goal. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T
WAIT 134-41 (1964). King wrote:
the nation ... must incorporate in its planning some compensatory consideration
for the handicaps [the Negro] has inherited from the past . . . . [We must] do
something special for [the Negro] now, in order to balance the equation and equip
him to compete ....
Id. at 146-47. See also Anthony Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) (arguing that Dr.
King realized that "colorblind" legalisms could not sweep away the United States' legacy
of racism); DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 310 (1986) (noting King's support for a
"compensatory crash program" for Blacks).
On the other hand, King's program was not wholly race-conscious. In order to insure
the support of the white working class, he was willing to extend remedial measures to
"poor whites." Id. at 312. See HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL: A CRITICAL STUDY
OF BLACKS AND MINORITIES IN AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCIETY 238-41, 256-57 (1987) for a
convincing argument that King's positions on the need for integration and colorblindness
were often contradictory. Professor Cruse notes, for example, that King's "transcendent
moral postures on the universal brotherhood of man" were in conflict with his position as
the "preeminent representative of the one and only traditional and 'separate' institution
that blacks . . . controlled," which "neither King nor any of his brother preachers ever
contemplated, intimated or suggested.., should be integrated out of existence in deference
to anyone's concept of racial equality." Id. at 241.
'2 MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUC-
TION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990 186-87 (1991) [hereinafter MARABLE, RACE, REFORM,
AND REBELLION].
33 For treatments of the conditions of African-Americans prior to the general deseg-
regation of American life, see generally, C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
JIM CROW (1974); AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOT RUDWICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHETTO
(1970); AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOT RUDWICK, ALONG THE COLOR LINE (1976); E. FRANKLIN
FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES (1949); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY
TO FREEDOM (1968); HOWARD QUINT, PROFILE IN BLACK AND WHITE: A FRANK PORTRAIT
OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1958). See also KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 81-82 (a poignant
description of the Black experience under segregation).
m According to Dr. Marable, several false assumptions made colorblindness appealing.
Chief among these was the belief that "as African-Americans escaped the ghetto and were
more broadly distributed across the social class structure and institutions of society, racial
tensions and bigotry would decline in significance." MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND RE-
BELLION, supra note 32, at 187.
35 See LISTON POPE, THE KINGDOM BEYOND CASTE 71-72, 77-78 (1957). See also
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salism and progressive thought. 36 Implicit in colorblindness, then,
is a form of racial symmetry in which "discrimination against
whites gains the same disreputable status as discrimination against
blacks."37
A. The Ascendancy of Colorblind Constitutionalism
The term "colorblind constitutionalism," as used in this Arti-
cle, refers to the application of colorblind ideology to the interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause. 38 Colorblind interpretations
of constitutionality focus exclusively on equality of treatment and
are unconcerned with equality in the broader, result-oriented
sense. 39 Additionally, colorblind constitutionalism insists on strict
scrutiny-rather than weaker tests such as rational basis40 or in-
termediate scrutiny4 1-for review of government conduct that fa-
vors subjugated racial and ethnic groups. Colorblind constitution-
alism thus fails to distinguish between minority and majority status
and disallows affirmative steps to achieve racial justice. In this
way, minority rights granted through government action are held
hostage by the rhetoric of racial equality propounded by whites.
The variant of colorblind constitutionalism currently in vogue
can be traced to the 1978 Supreme Court decision in University of
California Regents v. Bakke.42 The centerpiece of this widely dis-
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 96-
101 (1967) (discussing the moral value of equal treatment as deriving from the relatedness
of mankind to God).
36 See Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 30, at 772. Professor Peller explains that
"[ilntegrationist beliefs are organized around the familiar enlightenment story of progress
as consisting of the movement from mere belief and superstition to knowledge and reason,
from the particular and therefore parochial to the universal and therefore enlightened." Id.
These beliefs find their practical realization in policies which attempt "to universalize
institutional practices in order to efface the distortions of irrational factors like race, to
make social life neutral to racial identity." Id. at 773.
37 Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407,
1412 (1990) [hereinafter Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law].
-' See Gotanda, Color-Blind, supra note 7, at 2 (describing "colorblind constitutional-
ism" as "a collection of legal themes functioning as racial ideology").
39 See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
40 See School Committee v. Board of Education, 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967)
appeal dism'd, 389 U.S. 572 (1968) (approving racial classification favoring minorities as
"reasonably related" to the statutory purpose of school desegregation).
41 See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (opinion of
Brennan, J.) ("racial classifications designed to further remedial ends 'must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives"') (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)).42Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
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cussed "reverse discrimination" case43 is Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion, which has become the most influential judicial state-
ment on how to shape an acceptable special admissions program. 44
While Justice Powell did not dispense with affirmative action pro-
grams entirely, he made it clear that the Court would not tolerate
disadvantages to so-called "innocent" whites, "who bear no re-
sponsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special
admissions program are thought to have suffered. ' 45 To protect
these whites, Powell wrote that the Court should require specific
findings of past discrimination 46 and apply strict scrutiny when
whites were disadvantaged, even though this standard of review
was traditionally applied only when members of suspect classes
were subjected to discriminatory treatment.47 Contending that the
Fourteenth Amendment was "framed in universal terms,' 48 Justice
Powel concluded:
The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color. If both are not
afforded the same protection then it is not equal ....
Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination. 49
Since Bakke, colorblindness has found expression as a domi-
nant theme in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence. The
opinions in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education50 and City of
41 The case arose when a white applicant contested the refusal of the University of
California at Davis Medical School to admit him to its M.D. program when it admitted
Black and Chicano applicants with lower admission test scores and lower undergraduate
grades. Id. at 277-78.
44 See JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS
OF INEQUALITY 207-13 (1979).
4 - Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
46 "We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members
of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence
of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations."
Id. at 307.
47 See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (first articulation of the strict
scrutiny standard); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
43 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293.
49 Id. at 289-91.
- 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company51 are particularly revealing of
the Court's growing commitment to colorblind ideology. In Wy-
gant, the plurality held it constitutionally impermissible to favor
more recently hired Black workers over whites with longer tenures
during layoffs. Justice Powell, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Rehnquist, wrote that "a 'core purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment'.., is to 'do away with all governmentally imposed discrim-
inations based on race."' 52 Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in
Croson also employed colorblind rhetoric to justify the Court's
repudiation of a minority set-aside plan.5 3 Writing that the "ulti-
mate goal" of the Equal Protection Clause was to "eliminate en-
tirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors
as a human being's race,' 54 O'Connor appealed to the "dream of
a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to
personal opportunity and achievement. '55 Justices Kennedy 56 and
Scalia57 also weighed in with concurring opinions in favor of race-
neutral constitutional analysis.
Judging by the positions taken in Wygant and Croson, at least
five current Supreme Court Justices-O'Connor, Scalia, Rehnqu-
ist, Kennedy and White-subscribe to colorblindness as their
philosophical basis for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause.58
5' 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
52 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
Elsewhere, the Wygant plurality declared that "This Court has 'consistently repudiated
distinctions between citizens because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."' Id. at 273 (quoting Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
53 The plan required awardees of city construction contracts to subcontract at least
30% of the contract's value to minority-owned businesses. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
5 Id. at 495 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 320) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Interestingly
enough, Justice Stevens used this phrase in Wygant while arguing for a decidedly color
conscious remedy on the grounds that protecting minority workers from layoffs was a
necessary "step toward that ultimate goal of eliminating from governmental decisionmaking
such irrelevant factors as a human being's race." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 320. Cf. supra note
31 (Martin Luther King, Jr.'s advocacy of race-conscious affirmative action).
55 Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06.
- "The moral imperative of race neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57 Placing discrimination against the white majority in the same category as that targeted
against people of color, Justice Scalia expressed the belief that "discrimination on the basis
of race is 'illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of demo-
cratic society."' Id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975)).
58 The commitment of two of these justices may be subject to question. Although
Justice White joined the Croson majority, he also voted to uphold the race conscious
policies of the Federal Communications Commission in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). This apparent vacillation in Metro Broadcasting may be a recognition
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The prospects for future colorblind judicial activism are bright.59
Since Croson, two new Supreme Court justices have been ap-
pointed. Though Justice Souter's attitudes toward race conscious-
ness are not yet certain, 60 Justice Thomas, while yet to hear a case
involving the Fourteenth Amendment, has made his preference
for colorblindness well known in other contexts. 61 These devel-
opments clearly indicate that the Supreme Court is moving vig-
orously toward the adoption of colorblind constitutionalism as the
jurisprudential norm62 and its recent cases 63 are but a harbinger of
what is to come.
of Croson's determination that broad remedial powers were vested in Congress. See Cro-
son, 488 U.S. at 488; Aleinikoff, Race-Consciousness, supra note 30, at 1061, 1077 n.82
and accompanying text.
Justice O'Connor appears to be one of colorblind constitutionalism's more strident
proponents, judging by her positions in Wygant, Croson and Metro Broadcasting. Yet she
uncharacteristically advocated a decidedly color-conscious position in Georgia v. Mc-
Collum, 112 S. Ct. at 2364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (endorsing use of peremptory challenge
to secure minority representation on juries in order to combat conscious and unconscious
racial bias). O'Connor may have intended this proposal merely to underscore her argument
with the majority over which colorblind rule most appropriately applied to the issues in
that case.
19 As of publication time, it is too early to determine what effect Bill Clinton's Novem-
ber 1992 election to the Presidency will have on the development of colorblind
constitutionalism.
6 See Aleinikoff, Race-Consciousness, supra note 30, at 1062. See also Ruth Marcus,
Senators Left Wondering After Hearing: Which is the Real David Souter?, WASH. POST,
Sept. 23, 1990, at A4; Ruth Marcus, Souter, As State Official, Opposed U.S. Racial
Breakdown Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1990, at A4. Given George Bush's focus on
eliminating race-conscious remedies, Souter was probably selected with this perspective in
mind and it seems likely that he will join the colorblind majority of the Court.
61 See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution -The
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J. 691, 700-03
(1987) (endorsing Justice Harlan's vision of a colorblind Constitution as embodying "the
ultimate American principle ... that all men are created equal"); Clarence Thomas, The
Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Speech to the Federalist Society for Law and Policy Studies, University of Virginia
School of Law (Mar. 5, 1988), in 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 68 (1989) (claiming that
colorblind constitutional interpretation would provide a higher-law foundation for the
Court's civil rights opinions); Clarence Thomas, Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil
Rights as an Interest, Speech to the Cato Institute (Oct. 2, 1987), in ASSESSING THE REAGAN
YEARS 391 (David Boaz ed., 1988).
62 Some have argued that the Court has not yet adopted colorblind formalism wholesale.
See, e.g., Willie Abrams, A Reply to Derrick Bell's Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 517,
521 (1992) (civil rights advocates have survived first round of judicial attacks launched by
Reagan and Bush appointees with civil rights laws virtually intact); john a. powell, Racial
Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REv. 533, 540 (1992) (arguing that only isolated
adoptions of suspect interpretations of formalism by the Court have materialized).
6 See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991) ("if our society is to continue to progress as a
multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes
retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury"); Powers v. Ohio, Ill S. Ct.
1364 (1991); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (fourteenth amendment prohibits
"unequal treatment in general and racial discrimination in particular").
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B. The Flawed Vision of Colorblindness
For all its surface attractiveness as social theory, colorblind-
ness carries within its ideological structure certain significant con-
tradictions which undermine its usefulness as an anti-discrimina-
tory tool. First, colorblindness makes it impossible to remedy pre-
existing discrimination. Second, colorblindness masks conscious
or unconscious racism. Taken together, these flaws make for an
inadequate, and even counterproductive, jurisprudence for freeing
Black rights from self-preserving notions of racial justice and
equality held by the white status quo.
1. Remedying Pre-existing Discrimination
Racial disparities exist in virtually every aspect of
American life.64  Whether the inquiry be in the
area of housing, 65  employment, 66  education, 67  in-
A See A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 150 (Gerald Jaynes &
Robin Williams, Jr., eds. 1989) [hereinafter A COMMON DESTINY] (tendency of whites "to
deny that race is currently a social problem" explains white opposition to equal opportunity
policies).
6 "Investigation of residential housing markets comparing blacks with whites of similar
income shows extensive housing discrimination against blacks." GERTRUDE EZORSKY,
RACISM & JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 12 (1991). In 1985, less than 44%
of all Black families owned homes, a statistic that is perhaps traceable to the difficulty
African-Americans at all income levels found in securing financing for home purchases.
MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION, supra note 32, at 209. Black renters fare no
better. In fact, several studies have shown that more than 50 percent of the time, white
apartment hunters are treated more favorably than their Black counterparts. U.S. Dep't of
Housing and Urban Development, Fair Housing Enforcement Demonstration 23-28, 37-
44 (1983).
6 As this Article goes to press, the Black unemployment rate is over 14%. Council of
Economic Advisers, Economic Indicators 12 (Sept. 1992). "For as long as records have
been kept .... [Black unemployment has been] approximately double [that of] whites." In
recent years it has been nearly three times the unemployment rate of whites. HACKER,
Two NATIONS supra note 10, at 102-03. Once employed, African-Americans are also more
likely than whites to face on-the-job discrimination. See Roy BROOKS, RETHINKING THE
AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 44 (1990) (citing study suggesting that middle-class African-
Americans are nine times more likely to encounter racial discrimination on the job than
are middle-class whites) [hereinafter BROOKS, RETHINKING RACE].
67 On average, African-Americans are less likely to have completed high school andjust over half as likely to have completed college than white Americans. HACKER, Two
NATIONS, supra note 10, at 234. See also BROOKS, RETHINKING RACE, supra note 65, at
81 (noting that college enrollment rate of whites increased over 12-year period from 1976
to 1988, while the rate for Blacks went down).
Black elementary school children generally receive inferior education in comparison
to white children. See generally, JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, THIRTY YEARS AFTER BROWN
(1985). While only one-fifth of white primary [and secondary] school students were placed
in low-achievement reading groups, close to one-half of all Black students were placed in
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come,6 incarceration rates, 69 or mortality rates, 70 it quickly be-
comes obvious that Blacks lag behind whites in every measure of
quality of life. 71 Blind to reality as well as color, proponents of
colorblind jurisprudence ignore such disparities, or deny that they
exist, and consequently offer no solutions for achieving a substan-
tively "equal" society.
Even-handed methods which treat the privileged the same as
the underprivileged, the advantaged the same as the disadvan-
taged, are inherently useless to make up for past inequalities. If
two boxes contain unequal amounts of sand, they cannot be equal-
ized by adding like amounts of sand. They can only be equalized
such groups. Id. at 5. Indeed, these disparities may be caused by gross inequities in monies
expended for Black as compared to those expended for white education, "in part as a result
of local (white) decision making." EZORSKY, RACISM & JUSTICE 13, supra note 65 (citing
Southern Regional Council, A Decade of Frustrations (1981)). See also JONATHAN KOZOL,
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991) (describing effects of
underfunding and general neglect of predominantly Black inner-city schools).
63 Black family income in 1990 was 58% of that earned by whites. HACKER, TWO
NATIONS, supra note 10, at 94. Thirty-two and one-half percent of white families earn over
$50,000 annually, but only 14.5% of Black families earn more than $50,000 a year. Id. at
98. Black men with four years of college earn only $780 for every $1,000 earned by white
men. Id. at 95. Most white households (69.8%) make more than $25,000 a year; most Black
households (56.5%) make less than $25,000 a year. Id. at 98. Consequently, more Blacks
may be found living in poverty. In 1991 the poverty rates by race were 10.7% for whites,
28.1% for Latinos and 31.9% for African-Americans. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 39, 41 (112th ed. 1992).
6Blacks constitute roughly 46% of the inmates in prisons and jails nationwide. Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice 41 (2d ed. 1988). The
Sentencing Project, a Washington, D.C.-based advocacy group, estimates that one-quarter
of Black men age 20 to 29 are either incarcerated, on probation or on parole. MARC MAUER,
YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROB-
LEM (The Sentencing Project, Feb. 1990). Two recent studies suggest that in major urban
areas the numbers of Black men serving sentences in institutions, on probation or on parole
may be vastly higher. Jerome G. Miller, Hobbling a Generation: Young African-American
Males in Washington D.C.'s Criminal Justice System (National Center on Institutions and
Alternatives, April 1992) (42% of African-American males ages 18-35 are involved in the
criminal justice system) and National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, Hobbling a
Generation: Young African-American Males in the Criminal Justice System of America's
Cities: Baltimore, Maryland (Sept. 1992) (56% of African-American males ages 18-35
involved in the criminal justice system).
70 Black male life expectancy is 7 years less than that of white males and 13 years less
than that of white women. MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION, supra note 32, at
208. The New England Journal of Medicine reported that the "life expectancy for a black
male born and living in Harlem is shorter than that of a male born in Bangladesh." Colin
McCord & Harold P. Freeman, Excess Mortality in Harlem 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 173
(1990).
7' See generally, REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND
THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA (1987); DANIEL R. FUSFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN GHETTO 103-235 (1984); HACKER, Two NATIONS,
supra note 10; A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 64; NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE
STATE OF BLACK AMERICA: 1990 (1990).
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if more sand is placed into the box with relatively less sand in it.
The adoption of colorblind strategies to address social inequalities
entails a decision to preserve the superior position of white citizens
vis-a-vis those of African descent.
Colorblindness fails to address existing disparities not only
because it is ill-suited for the task, but because it fails to acknowl-
edge that the task needs doing. Colorblind formalists view the
world through a crude lens which cannot bring societal discrimi-
nation into focus. 72 The invisibility of Black oppression to color-
blind observation results from two considerations, one practical
and the other theoretical.
As a practical matter, Black expressions of their own reality
have limited outlets for dissemination in a world where the major
forms of communication are controlled by the white majority.73 As
a nation, we see what the white-dominated media wants to show,
or what white media consumers want to see. Frequently, both
choose to ignore evidence of the continued existence of racial
oppression. 74 Black voices remain hostage to the majority's me-
diated perceptions.
The theoretical limitations of colorblindness arise from its
obsession with procedure and its willful ignorance of results. 75
Colorblind analysts tinker with the rules but need not attend to
7 See Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment, supra note 7 at 1346-47 ("it [is]
clear that a 'color-blind' society built upon the subordination of persons of one color [is] a
society which [cannot] correct that subordination because it [can] never recognize it.")
(quoting Alfred Blumrosen).
73 See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3003 (1990) (citing a
1986 study that found that minorities owned only 2.1% of the radio and television stations
in the United States, many of which "serve geographically limited markets with relatively
small audiences").
74 Aleinikoff tells us why this is so:
Blacks are "invisible" not in the sense that whites do not see them; they are
"invisible" in the sense that whites see primarily what a white dominant culture
has trained them to see. In a curious yet powerful way, whites create and reflect
a cultural understanding of blackness that requires little contribution from blacks
... not out of vindictiveness or animus but because the black stories simply do
not register.
Aleinikoff, Race-Consciousness, supra note 30, at 1070 (footnotes omitted).
75 See Delgado, Race Problem, supra note 30, at 1398. Justice Scalia took great pains
to underscore the focus on equality of process in his concurring opinion in Croson, 109 S.
Ct. at 739 ("[A]ny race-neutral remedial program aimed at the disadvantaged as such will
have a disproportionately beneficial impact on blacks. Only such a program, and not one
that operates on the basis of race, accords with the letter and spirit of our Constitution.")
(emphasis in original).
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the outcome of the game. Richard Delgado calls this preference
for equality of opportunity over equality of result a false
dichotomy.
One cannot judge whether two athletic teams are playing
fairly, on an even field, without attending to the results
of the game, and vice versa. Law's preference for pro-
tecting only equality of opportunity is, then, a veiled way
of assuring that those who benefit from the current rules
of the game continue winning.76
A focus on the playing field that does not look to the results of
the game values form over substance. As a consequence of its
ideological tunnel vision, colorblindness can only acknowledge and
remedy the most egregious forms of racism. 77
Colorblindness's fatal flaw is that it takes the game as played
by whites for the ideal. White requirements set the standard. If
the needs of Blacks are not met, that must be due to the failure of
Blacks, not of the standards. Colorblindness allows for no reor-
dering of priorities and no fundamental change in how the game
is played.
2. Colorblindness: A Smokescreen for Racial Injustice
Besides being ill-suited to remedy the problems of racial in-
equity that persist in America, colorblindness can be made an
instrument of active social injustice as well. Colorblindness pro-
vides a convenient cover for the exercise of benign (and sometimes
malignant) neglect, masks oppression and delegitimizes reform
efforts.
In its most common form, colorblindness serves to keep Black
rights hostage by operating as a defensive shield for conscious and
unconscious racists. Colorblind arguments deflect accusations that
the advantages which whites have in society are based on oppres-
sion or exploitation. "Objective" standards and universal proce-
76 Delgado, Race Problem, supra note 30 at 1398.
77 Id. at 1394.
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dures provide an alternative, "fair" explanation for white
privilege .78
From their failure to properly distinguish racial categories,
adherents of colorblindness erroneously conclude that race is not
a factor in how individuals are treated. Therefore, they oppose the
efforts of those who would inject a racial element into any debate. 79
Professor Gotanda points out that this conscious suppression of
race permits social problems such as housing and unemployment
to be evaluated as if the race of those affected was not a factor,
obscuring the continuing existence of institutional racism and the
correlation between race and the concentration of supposedly dis-
tinct problems.80
A related consequence of colorblind formalism is its tendency
to reinforce white cultural hegemony.8' Viewing human accom-
plishments through colorblind lenses deprives Black communities
and individuals of deserved credit for their accomplishments.8 2
Colorblindness is particularly suspect, given that:
[t]he theory that no important differences exist between
Blacks and Whites in America ... is of recent origin. It
gained prominence at precisely the time when Blacks
began to insist they did have distinctive attitudes, values,
and lifestyles and began to question the validity and rel-
evance of White culture. At the same time that Whites
wanted to be color-blind, Blacks were demanding sepa-
rate admissions standards to schools and jobs. Thus the
78 Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 31, at 778; Freeman, Antidiscrimination
Law, supra note 38, at 1433-41. See also Delgado, Race Problem, supra note 31, at 1396-
97 ("persons of the majority race have ... constructed racial realities so as to avoid any
sense of personal responsibility"); Gotanda, Color-Blind, supra note 7, at 37-40, 49 (dem-
onstrating how colorblindness hides an inherent asymmetry in the status afforded white
and Black individuals on account of race).
79 As an example of "racial non-recognition" in action, Neil Gotanda refers to Patricia
Williams's story of how student law review editors sought to remove racial references from
her description of her experience of being excluded from entering a clothing store. Gotanda,
Color-Blind, supra note 7, at 19-20 (discussing Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the
Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U.
MIAMI L. Rlv. 127, 128 (1986)).
10 Gotanda, Color-Blind, supra note 7, at 45.
81 See generally Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 7, at 1369-
81 (arguing that the failure to consider race legitimates both the domination of Blacks and
the white elitist hierarchy).
" See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Race-Consciousness, supra note 30, at 1080 (describing how
students taught the accomplishments of George Washington Carver and Martin Luther
King, Jr. without any mention of their race believed both men were white).
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ideology of universalism must be viewed in proper con-
text. It is mostly an attempt by Whites to maintain insti-
tutional arrangements which embody the residual results
of past overt racism. 83
Far from being a guarantor of social justice, then, colorblindness
has the potential for concrete use against oppressed communities.
By obscuring the reality of Black subjugation, colorblindness den-
ies the legitimacy of efforts to secure racial justice.8 4 In a colorblind
world, no investigation need take place into whether justice in
theory translates into justice in fact. A racial utopia requires no
reform.
II. Race Consciousness and the Development of Jury
Discrimination Case Law
Colorblind doctrine has never taken full root in the Supreme
Court's Equal Protection cases dealing with the selection of juries.
This is due in large part to the factual context in which these cases
arose. Historically, most complaints against discriminatory jury
selection procedures have been made by Black defendants seeking
to overturn convictions returned by all-white or overwhelmingly
white juries.8 5 In those few cases that did not fit the mold of a
racial or ethnic minority seeking to avoid discriminatory treatment
8 ROBERT STAPLES, INTRODUCTION TO BLACK SOCIOLOGY 260-61 (1976), cited in
Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 30, at 778 n.34. Peller notes that the tenets of
colorblindness are "historically constructed" and thus are "manifestations of group power,"
rather than pure artifacts of intellectual production. Id. at 779. The irony in this, according
to Peller, and indeed a further obstacle to Black freedom, is that the colorblind emphasis
on purportedly objective "standards" allows "the former administrators of racial segrega-
tion" to determine what these standards are and how they will be met. Id. at 778. See also
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,
1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 733 (1990) (arguing that white male law faculty members have the
power to determine whether legal scholarship meets acceptable standards and also "the
power to create the traditions or projects within which they will make these judgments").
Kennedy is decidedly unsympathetic to any claim that the "objective" standards of legal
academia are either universally beneficial or evenly applied. Id. at 718.
14 See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 7, at 1348 (discussing
how the appearance of equality created by colorblindness delegitimates the movement for
true equality).
5 I include here cases where claims of discriminatory jury selection were made by
members of historically oppressed groups other than Blacks. See, e.g., Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (upholding Latino defendant's claim).
1993]
82 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
at the hands of a power-wielding majority, the Supreme Court
decided on grounds other than the Fourteenth Amendment.8 6
The Equal Protection jurisprudence of jury selection cases
was also shaped heavily by the belief of the nineteenth-century
Supreme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended by
Congress as an explicitly color-conscious solution to the country's
racial problems. 7 This core belief was never fundamentally chal-
lenged in jury discrimination cases until recently, although it lost
currency in other contexts much earlier.88 Until Powers, the Court
was forced to take conscious notice of the race of the defendant
and to shape explicitly race-conscious remedies in order to protect
the Black defendant's Equal Protection rights.
A. Early Equal Protection Cases
The Supreme Court set out its basic outline of the discrimi-
natory jury selection challenge at a very early stage, soon after
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. To make an Equal
Protection challenge to the composition of the jury, a defendant
had to demonstrate that: (1) members of his or her race were being
excluded from jury service; and (2) the exclusion was purposeful,
that is, intentionally racially motivated.
The first jury selection case to invoke the Equal Protection
Clause to bar the discriminatory exclusion of Blacks was Strauder
v. West Virginia.89 In Strauder, a Black defendant was convicted
of murder by an all-white jury after his petition for removal of his
case to federal court was denied. 90 The defendant had sought
86 The Court has overturned exclusionary jury selection procedures based on a number
of different rationales. In addition to the equal protection clause, the Court has relied on
the sixth amendment's right to an impartial jury, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (sixth amendment held to forbid exclusion of women from jury service); the right of
criminal defendants to due process, see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (plurality found
jury selection procedures that excluded Blacks from white defendant's jury violated due
process on mixed statutory and constitutional grounds); and its supervisory authority over
the federal court system. See Theil v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (discrim-
ination against blue-collar workers held impermissible).
87 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1526 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
88 See Lively, Equal Protection, supra note 30.
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
90 Removal was permitted under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended in 1870.
Removal was the preferred remedy for Black defendants who feared they could not get fair
trials in the courts of the formerly slaveholding South. For a discussion of this practice,
see Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 65, n.323 (1990)
[hereinafter Colbert, Challenging the Challenge].
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removal on the grounds that a West Virginia statute91 excluding
Blacks from jury service denied him the equal protection of the
laws.92 In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court readily
concluded that a law which "compell[ed] a colored man to submit
to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the
State has expressly excluded every man of his race . ... 93
constituted a clear denial of equal protection.
The Strauder Court was by no means overwhelmingly sym-
pathetic to the plight of the newly freed African,94 yet it was aided
in its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by a healthy
dose of realism. 95 Instead of seeking to construct transcendent,
objective, but ultimately useless neutral principles that were blind
to a defendant's color, the Court framed its considerations in view
of the "history of the times. '96 The "history of the times" forced
the Court to acknowledge the Amendment's intended role in con-
fronting the legacy of slavery and the reality of white racism. 97
Consequently, the Court interpreted the Constitution to require
more than mere symmetry in the government's treatment of Black
and white citizens. 98 The Court realized that allowing West Virgin-
91 The West Virginia statute provided that only "white male persons, who are twenty-
one years of age, and not over sixty, and who are citizens of this state, shall be able to
serve as jurors .... 1872 W. Va. Acts 102.
92 Emphasizing the racist nature of West Virginia justice, the defendant claimed in his
petition to the Court that the statute deprived him of the "full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 100 U.S. at 304.
91 Id. at 309.
9 Indeed, the Court's own racism is evident in its characterization of the considerations
that called for the passage of the fourteenth amendment:
The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in that condition was
unfitted to command the respect of those who-had superior intelligence. Their
training had left them mere children, and as such they needed the protection which
a wise government extends to those who are unable to protect themselves.
Id. at 306.
95 See Colbert, Challenging the Challenge, supra note 90, at 66.
96 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306.
97 According to the Court, "the one pervading purpose" of the fourteenth amendment
was to insure "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that
freedom, and the protection of the newly made freedman and citizen from the oppressions
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over them." Id. at 307 (citing The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1876)). The Strauder Court repeatedly emphasized that
the purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to end the oppression of the Black race by
the white. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-09.
"The Court did note that the exclusion of all Blacks from a Black defendant's jury
violated the equal protection clause, just as excluding all white citizens from jury service
in a state where Blacks were a majority would deprive a white defendant of equal protection.
Id. at 308.
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ia's statute to stand would not only treat the Black defendant99
unequally, but would subject him to racial oppression. 00 Providing
equal protection, then, in the jury selection process was a means
to the greater end of preventing the racial subjugation of African-
Americans through the criminal justice system.
99 Some commentators (and the Powers Court) have erroneously concluded that the
Strauder Court was concerned with equal protection violations against Black jurors. See
Powers, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1369 (1991). The Strauder Court did note the discriminatory
purpose of jury composition law:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute
all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their
color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is
practically a brand upon them .... an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant
to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the
race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. Yet, other than its use here to establish the threshold fact that
such a law could only be for the purpose of racial segregation, the Court did not concern
itself with the plight of the excluded Black jurors. Its real interest lay with the Black
defendant, who was not permitted to rest his equal protection claim on the fact that the
statute prevents him from serving on a West Virginia jury. See Barbara D. Underwood,
Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 CoLuM.
L. REV. 725, 743 (1992) ("[tlhe Strauder Court [did not treat] the injury to jurors ... as
the central rights violation in the case, but rather as an additional reason for recognizing
the defendant's personal right to equal protection (an equal right to same-race jurors)").
The denial of equal protection to the defendant comes from the fact that he or she was
tried before a jury from which all members of his or her race have been excluded. As the
Court put it:
mhe statute of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors, as it does,
against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection
of the laws to a colored man when he is put upon trial for an alleged offense
against the State ....
Id. at 310 (emphasis supplied). See also Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880); Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1881).
100 The Strauder Court was concerned that the exclusion of Blacks from juries would
allow the oppression of Blacks to continue. Requiring Blacks to be tried before all-whitejuries would allow Black defendants to be unjustly convicted by prejudiced whites. The
Court stated that the fourteenth amendment must, like statutory provisions at common
law,
make impossible what Mr. Bentham called "packing juries." It is well known that
prejudices often exist against particular classes in the community, which sway the
judgment ofjurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons
of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy.
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309. Cf. Albert W. Aschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir
Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
189 (1989) (arguing Strauder's holding was based on the proposition that "[B]lacks were
more likely to favor the defendant's acquittal than white jurors").
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The true limit of Strauder was clarified in another criminal
jury selection case, decided that same day. In Virginia v. Rives,10'
the Supreme Court held that the refusal of a state judge to place
qualified Black citizens on a selection list for grand and petit juries
violated the Equal Protection Clause.10 2 At the same time, how-
ever, Rives' focus on procedural issues 03 rendered Strauder more
a regulation of form than substance.
Rives displayed the Court's early commitment to an intent-
based equal protection standard by its refusal to find discrimination
solely because the challenged statute had an adverse impact on
Blacks. The Court was not swayed by the defendants' allegation
that no Black jurors had ever been seated in a criminal or civil
case in which Blacks had an interest. 104 Moreover, the Rives Court
rejected a request by the defendants, two Black men accused of
murdering a white man, that their trial jury venire be adjusted so
that it would be at least one-third Black.105 The Court's later
statements to the contrary, 10 6 the defendants do not appear to have
been asserting a "right to have the jury composed in part of colored
men."107 Rather, they were seeking the opportunity to select from
a pool that contained at least some Black people, 08 which seems
reasonable given the local demographics'0 9 and the fact that the
exclusion of Blacks from the venire was the practical result of the
alleged Equal Protection violation." 0 The Supreme Court, how-
101 00 U.S. 313 (1880).
M Id. at 321.
103 For example, the Court held that in the absence of a facially discriminatory statute,
removal to federal court was unavailable, leaving most Black defendants to defend their
suits in hostile state courts. Id. at 332. See also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 387, 393
(1880). For a critique of this practice, see Colbert, Challenging the Challenge, supra note
90, at 68 and authorities cited therein.
14 Rives, 100 U.S. at 315.
105 Id. at 314.
106 Id. at 323.
107 Id. Professor Johnson, however, makes a persuasive argument that the fourteenth
amendment should uphold such a right. See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 17. For
a similar argument on thirteenth amendment grounds, see Colbert, Challenging the Chal-
lenge, supra note 90.
103 The defendants requested that the "venire" be adjusted to include African-Ameri-
cans. 100 U.S. at 314. The "venire" or "panel" is a subset of the overall jury pool from
which the actual petit jury is selected. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLO-
BOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 615 (2d ed. 1986).
109 In 1880, Blacks constituted over twenty percent of the county population. STATIS-
TICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE TENTH CENSUS (JUNE 1, 1880)
(Census Office, Dept. of the Interior) 412 (1883) [hereinafter 1880 CENSUS].
110 Eventually, the Supreme Court came to recognize that a defendant's right to equal
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ever, rejected this request out of hand, saying only that "[a] mixed
jury in a particular case is not essential to the equal protection of
the laws." '
Only one aspect of the Court's approach to jury selection
cases changed over the 110 years after Strauder and Rives set this
strict but race-conscious standard: the Court gradually lessened
the level of proof necessary for a defendant to establish the exis-
tence of intentional discrimination. The Court thus maintained the
standard set in Rives but acknowledged the constitutional mandate
for protecting Black defendants recognized in Strauder. In Neal
v. Delaware,"2 a Black/white rape case decided the year after
Strauder and Rives, the Court held that uncontroverted evidence
that Black persons had always been excluded from state court
juries established a prima facie Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tion,1 3 one which could not be rebutted by merely alleging that
none of the Black citizens in the state" 4 were qualified to sit as
jurors.15 Over time, the Court grew even more willing to infer the
existence of intentional discrimination, relaxing its requirement of
"substantial disparity,"' 1 6 caused at least in part by the exercise of
subjective criteria, to one of "statistical disparity" between the
number of Blacks in the population and those in the jury pool."17
protection in jury selection was meaningless without assurances that the jury pool would
be representative of the minority population in the community. See infra note 117.
For a critique of the argument that denying Black defendants the right to seat same-
race jurors deprives them of a cognizable constitutional right, see Underwood, supra note
99, at 731-33 (objecting to theories that would include Black jurors for the benefit of Black
defendants because "race-based generalization[s] about the likely views of jurors cannot
lawfully be the basis for any legal rule"). Arguing the primacy of colorblind principles,
Underwood concludes that equal protection challenges to jury composition should be based
solely on cognizance ofjurors' right not to be discriminated against in the selection process.
See id. at 742-50.
M Rives, 100 U.S. at 323.
112 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
"1 Id. at 397.
114 Blacks at the time numbered over 26,000 persons or approximately 22% of the state
population. 1880 CENSUS, supra note 109, at 384.
115 103 U.S. at 397. The Chief Judge of the Delaware court found the total exclusion
of Black persons from jury service unremarkable because "the great body of black men
residing in this State are utterly unqualified by want of intelligence, experience, or moral
integrity to sit on juries." Id. at 393-94.
116 See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (Frankfurter and Reed, J.J.,
concurring separately) (discriminatory intent found where Blacks were 25% of the popu-
lation in the county, yet only 5% of the names on the jury list belonged to Black citizens);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (finding discrimination where Blacks comprised 60%
of the population but accounted for only 37% of the places on the jury list); Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (discrimination established when Black population of parish
was 21%, but only 7% of those selected for grand jury venires were Black).
117 By the late 20th century, the Court was willing to find intentional discrimination
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It should be underscored that the Supreme Court never varied
from its cardinal requirement that the defendant alleging an Equal
Protection violation in a jury discrimination case show that mem-
bers of "his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs"' 8
were intentionally excluded from jury service. Protecting Black
defendants from racial subjugation was the clear concern of the
Supreme Court, no matter how ineffective its methods turned out
to be." 9
B. Peremptory Challenge Cases
The Supreme Court has always purported to apply the same
Equal Protection principles when it hears a challenge to the com-
position of trial as well as to grand juries. 20 Yet the Court was
never squarely confronted with a case contesting discrimination
which occurred after selection of the jury venire. Admittedly, early
cases sometimes scrutinized the exclusion of Blacks from petit
juries, but these cases involved mechanisms of exclusion which
operated prior to voir dire. 121 The Supreme Court did not hear a
case which directly challenged discrimination during voir dire until
1965, at which time it explicitly rejected the extension of Equal
Protection case law to a state's exercise of its peremptory
challenges.
In Swain v. Alabama,2 2 the Court accepted the argument in
principle that intentionally excluding Blacks from a trial jury would
based solely on a showing by the defendant of a statistical disparity greater than that
allowed for by chance, concurrent with a selection process that provides an "opportunity
to discriminate." See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (finding "key man" system
of jury selection operated in a discriminatory manner when only 39% of the grand jurors
selected over an 11-year period were Spanish-surnamed, in a Texas county that was over
79% Chicano).
118 Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
119 See DERRICK BELL, RACE RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 350 (3d ed. 1992) [herein-
after BELL, RACE, RACIsM] (claiming that the Court's standards for "racial fairness" injury
selection may seem "worthwhile in the abstract but.., are... woefully inadequate in
practice").
120 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 229 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
121 For example, the defendant in Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953), objected to
the makeup of the petit jury that tried his case because the members of the venire had
been selected by a judge from a box in which the names of white jurors had been placed
on white cards and the names of Black jurors had been placed on yellow cards.
1- 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 but it nevertheless refused
to question Alabama's removal of all potential Black jurors from
the case of the defendant before it.124 As far as the Court was
concerned, a state's exercise of its peremptory challenges was not
subject to judicial scrutiny. 125
The Court took this position in Swain chiefly because of the
high value it placed on the peremptory challenge. 126 The Court
agreed with Alabama that arbitrary challenges eliminated "the ex-
tremes of partiality on both sides"'127 and satisfied the parties that
their case would be fairly decided, since they made their own
juries.128 Additionally, the Court noted that peremptories permitted
the parties to fully explore their for-cause challenges, secure in
the knowledge that, should a juror be antagonized and the chal-
lenge for cause fail, the juror could be removed by peremptory
challenge anyway. 129 The Court also cautioned that the peremptory
challenge should not be tampered with lightly, since it was "one
of the most important of the rights secured to the accused"' 30 and
had been in use for over 600 years. 131 Rather than subject this
essential legal device to too much scrutiny, the Swain Court stated
that:
The presumption in any particular case must be that the
prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair
and impartial jury .... The presumption is not overcome
...by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes
were removed from the jury or that they were removed
because they were Negroes. 132
2 Id. at 204.
124 Alabama used the "struck jury" method of jury selection where each side "strikes"
or excuses members of the venire in turn, winnowing it down to trial size. Ala. Code, Tit.
30, § 64 (1958). For purposes of its opinion the Court treated this system as identical to
one in which peremptory challenges were employed. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 211.
1
25 Id. at 212.
'2 Id. at 220 ("The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one
exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's
control").
12 Id. at 219.
128 See id.
129 Id. at 219-20.
130 Id. at 219 (citing Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
31 Id. at 213.
131 Id. at 222. It is almost unbelievable that the Court would find nothing suspicious
about the total exclusion of Blacks from juries in a former Confederate state considering
the well-documented amount of enmity and violence directed at African-Americans both
historically and at the time the case was heard. See generally, Colbert, supra note 90.
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The Court was willing to concede that the systematic exclusion of
Blacks in case after case would violate the Equal Protection
Clause, but it insisted that the record in the case before it was
insufficient to support the conclusion that such discrimination had
occurred.'33 Even proof of total exclusion of Blacks from previous
trials would be insufficient to establish a Fourteenth Amendment
violation if non-state actors also participated in the selection
process.3 4
The Swain Court was ready to sacrifice the anti-subjugation
interest of individual Black defendants in favor of the peremptory
challenge, but it was willing to preserve, under limited circum-
stances, the rights of African-Americans to participate in the crim-
inal justice system as jurors. 135 Thus, the primacy of Black jurors'
participation interests over the rights of Black defendants, later
enshrined in Powers,3 6 found its origins in the Court's ill-consid-
ered decision in Swain.137
Twenty years after Swain, in light of experience showing that
"the practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries
in cases with black defendants remains widespread,"'13 8 the Court
revisited the balance it had struck between the peremptory chal-
lenge and the Equal Protection Clause. This time, in Batson v.
133 Id. at 223-25 (citing lack of evidence "of what the prosecution did or did not do on
its own account in any cases other than the one at bar"). In his dissent, Justice Goldberg
argued vehemently that there was evidence in the record showing that the state prosecutor,
by his own admission, independently and intentionally excluded all African-Americans
from trial jury venires. Id. at 234-35 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The majority itself admitted
that the defendant had established that "[a]pparently in some cases, the prosecution agreed
with the defense to remove [Blacks]." Id. at 224-25. See also id. at 225, n.31.
,34 Id. at 227.
115 Id. at 224 (the presumption that the state was using its peremptory challenges to
ensure a fair and impartial jury could be overcome by evidence "that the peremptory
system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in
the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population"). See Bruce J. Winick,
Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and
a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9-10, n.34 and accompanying text (1982).
136 See infra notes 155-178 and accompanying text.
137 Swain was heavily criticized for its failure to allow Black defendants to contest
discrimination in their individual cases. See, e.g., JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 166-67 (1977);
Frederick L. Brown, Frank T. Mcguire & Mary S. Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as
a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 192, 197-98 (1978); Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving A Democratic
Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 247, 268-70 (1973); Rodger Kuhn, Jury Discrimination:
The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 283-303 (1968); George Bundy Smith, Swain v.
Alabama, The Use of Peremptory Challenges to Strike Blacks from Juries, 27 How. L.J.
1571, 1577 (1984).
138 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
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Kentucky, 139 the Court concluded that the removal of Black jurors
by peremptory challenge because of their race violates the Con-
stitution, even when there is no evidence of racially motivated
strikes in cases other than the defendant's. The Court determined
that continuing to require Black defendants to show a pattern or
practice of discrimination would place a "crippling" burden of
proof on them140 and "would be inconsistent with the promise of
equal protection to all.' 14'
The Batson test for uncovering the discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges required first that the criminal defendant show
that he or she was "a member of a cognizable racial group, and
that the prosecutor [had] exercised peremptory challenges to re-
move from the venire members of the defendant's race."' 4 Upon
establishing this, the defendant could rely on the fact that the
subjective nature of the exercise of the peremptory challenge "per-
mits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' '"143
The defendant would then have to "raise an inference" of racial
discrimination, based on the "relevant circumstances," such as a
pattern of strikes against Black venirepersons or the nature of the
prosecution's statements and questions during voir dire. 44 The
burden then shifted to the prosecution to rebut the allegation of
improper motivation. 145
Batson was hardly an unalloyed victory for civil rights. The
demands of the Equal Protection Clause finished a poor second in
this decision to the traditional nature and form of the peremptory
challenge. Justice Marshall adroitly spotted two potential problems
'19 Id. Like Neal before it, Batson involved a Black defendant accused of raping a
white woman. In Batson, the prosecution had removed all four Blacks from the jury by
use of its peremptories.
140 Id. at 92.
141 Id. at 95-96 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 965 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certioriari)).
142 Id. at 96 (citation omitted).
143 Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. at 562).
I" Id. at 96-97. Although the Court indicated that these two suggestions were not
intended to be exhaustive, most lower courts have treated these factors as requirements.
In fact, some jurisdictions refuse to recognize even a prima facie showing of discrimination
unless at least three Black jurors were removed by the prosecution. See id. at 105 (Marshall,
J., concurring) and cases cited therein.
'45 The prosecution must provide a "neutral explanation" of its use of its peremptories
to challenge Black jurors. Id. at 97. In essence, the Court's analysis still permits the
prosecution to exercise its peremptory challenges for any reason or no reason at all-
except on the assumption that Black jurors "would be partial to the defendant because of
their shared race." Id.
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with the Court's holding in his concurring opinion: the difficulty
of establishing a prima facie case 146 and the ease with which the
prosecution might rebut that case. 147 Given that the judges and
prosecutors at both the state and federal levels are overwhelmingly
white, 148 Marshall's admonition about the inability of the bench to
adequately apply the Batson test is particularly telling:
A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may
lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black
juror is "sullen," or "distant," a characterization that
would not have come to his mind if a white juror had
acted identically. A judge's own conscious or uncon-
scious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation
as well supported. 149
Experience, unfortunately, has proven Justice Marshall correct. 50
Nonetheless, Batson remained true, for the most part, to es-
tablished Equal Protection jurisprudence. Reaffirming the unful-
filled promise of Strauder, the Court declared that "the State den-
ies a Black defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts
1
46 Batson, 476 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall emphasized
that some jurisdictions will not consider a Batson claim without the occurrence of three or
more discriminatory challenges of minority jurors. Id.
147 The prosecution need only mention a facially neutral reason for the striking of the
juror, which, as Marshall points out, "trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess." Id. at
106.
148 In Florida, for example, a state that is almost 14 percent Black, only six percent of
the state prosecutors and only four percent of the state court judges are African-Americans.
FLA. Sup. CT. RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMM., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION -
"WHERE THE INJURED FLY FOR JUSTICE": REFORMING PRACTICES WHICH IMPEDE THE
DISPENSATION OF JUSTICE TO MINORITIES IN FLORIDA 14, 26 (1990) [hereinafter FLA. SUP.
CT. COMM. REPORT]. The report concludes that "[the State simply cannot expect continued
acceptance of a judicial system in which minorities are virtually invisible in positions of
decision-making and responsibility." Id. at 11.
149 476 U.S. at 106.
1S0 See, e.g., Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, supra note 100, at 170-76;
Colbert, Challenging tile Challenge, supra note 90, at 96-99; Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney,
Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate
Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 27-62 (1988); Jonathan B. Mintz, Batson v.
Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory
Challenges under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1026,
1034-38 (1987); David D. Hopper, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory
Challenge:Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REv. 811, 818-31 (1988).
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him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have
been purposefully excluded."'151
Although the Court expressed concern for the rights of the
excluded Black jurors," 2 this clearly was not its primary interest.
Otherwise, it would not have required a shared racial identity
between the excluded juror and the defendant.
The Court was primarily concerned with protecting Black
defendants from racially motivated prosecutions. This concern, in
the Court's view, constituted the essence of an Equal Protection
violation:
Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to
exclude black persons from the venire on the assumption
that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors,
so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the
assumption that they will be biased in a particular case
simply because the defendant is black. 153
Thus, every Equal Protection case-from Strauder to Batson-
dealt explicitly with the question of the defendant's racial iden-
tity. 154 In each of these cases, intentional exclusion of Black jurors
151 Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. The Court went on to remark:
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not
exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as
jurors.
Id. at 86 (citations omitted).
152 The Batson Court asserted that the intentional exclusion of potential Black jurors
denied African-Americans "the same right and opportunity to participate in the administra-
tion of justice enjoyed by the white population." 476 U.S. at 91 (quoting Swain, 380 U.S.
at 224).
153 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (citations omitted).
"5 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S.
463 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). Unlike the equal protection clause,
other grounds for contesting jury composition have not been interpreted to require the
defendant/complainant to be a member of the excluded group. See, e.g., Taylor v. Loui-
siana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (male defendant permitted to challenge the exclusion of women
on sixth amendment grounds); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 (1990) (white defendant
may raise sixth amendment challenge to exclusion of Blacks from jury venire); Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (due process rationale invoked to permit white defendant to
contest exclusion of African-American jurors); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946) (male defendant allowed to challenge the exclusion of women under Court's super-
visory authority). Indeed, it is the Court's reluctance to extend its equal protection analysis
to cover forms of jury exclusion not based on racial or ethnic differences that best explains
the development of these alternative legal theories. Cf. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
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was thought to be akin to "jury packing," depriving a Black de-
fendant of a fair trial. Thus, throughout the years, the Court held
fast to two fundamental aspects of its Fourteenth Amendment jury
selection case law: the protection of the Black defendant from
unjust conviction, and, to that end, the requirement of racial iden-
tity between the defendant and the excluded juror.
III. The Advent of Colorblind Jury Selection: Powers v. Ohio
and Georgia v. McCollum
A. Powers v. Ohio
In Powers v. Ohio,155 the Supreme Court, for the first time,
granted white defendants the right to protest the exclusion of
potential Black jurors from their trials. In previous cases, the
Court's analysis had focused on the possibility of racial oppression
of the defendant. Yet in Powers, the Court emphasized the right
of Black jurors not to be excluded on the basis of their race. This
shift in emphasis placed Black rights at the mercy of white privi-
lege, leaving Black jurors in the hands of guardians who are, at
best, indifferent to the goal of racial justice.
1. Background and Rationale
Larry Joe Powers must have seemed an unlikely candidate
for a major role in the development of jury discrimination law. A
white defendant charged with the murder and attempted murder
of other whites, Powers came before the Supreme Court objecting
to the removal of potential Black jurors from his trial through the
prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges.156 Although his
case involved no racial issues, 157 Powers argued that Batson v.
Kentucky required the prosecution to demonstrate that its chal-
lenges were not racially motivated. In a seven to two decision, the
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 965-67 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that until the extension of the
sixth amendment to the states, "efforts . . . to upset state juries on grounds other than
racial exclusion did not meet with success").
15 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
156 The prosecution used seven of its ten peremptory challenges to remove potential
Black jurors. Id. at 1366.
15 Joint Appendix at 32. The Ohio Court of Appeals observed that Powers is white,
that his alleged victims were white and that the defense counsel and prosecutor who tried
his case were "apparently" white as well. Id. at 24.
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Court agreed that Batson challenges may be raised without regard
to the defendant's race. 158
At its outset, Powers reaffirmed the well-settled proposition
that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the
defendant's right to equal protection under the law, although the
Court took pains to express this premise in race-neutral language.
Justice Kennedy wrote that "a defendant is denied equal protection
of the laws when tried before a jury from which members of his
or her race have been excluded by the State's purposeful con-
duct. ' 159 Obviously, Powers' Equal Protection Clause rights were
not violated in this manner since he was white and the excluded
jurors were Black. 160
As Justice Kennedy's language reveals, a completely race-
neutral interpretation of Batson would only allow white defendants
to object to the intentional exclusion of white jurors. The Court
needed some other reason to extend this right to defendants who
do not share racial identity with excluded jurors. As one possibil-
ity, the Court could have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
as providing every criminal defendant with a substantive right to
a trial before a jury selected in a racially nondiscriminatory way.
In fact, the defense briefed and argued this point before the Court,
and Justice Kennedy considered it briefly in his opinion. 161 Yet the
158 Powers, 1l1 S. Ct. at 1366.
159 Id. at 1367. Kennedy's reference to race here is generic. See also id. at 1368 ("a
defendant" can raise an equal protection challenge when a prosecutor excludes "members
of the defendant's race"). It appears that a defendant of any race-white, Black or other-
wise-would suffer an equal protection violation if a juror of the same race were excluded
from jury service on the presumption that the juror would be biased in favor of the defendant
or that members of the defendant's race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.
16 Since this is true, it was not necessary for the Court's opinion to discuss this point
at all. Perhaps the Court simply found the opportunity to restate the scope of the fourteenth
amendment in race-neutral terms irresistible. Did the same temptation drive the Court to
omit all race-specific references from its citations of prior cases? For example, the Court
transformed Strauder's reference to "a colored man" to the more generic term, "a defen-
dant." 111 S. Ct. at 1367. See also id. at 1368 ("In Batson, we spoke of the harm caused
when a defendant is tried by a tribunal from which members of his own race have been
excluded") (emphasis supplied). The most flagrant example of Kennedy's colorblind revi-
sionism appeared in a key passage quoted from Strauder. The original passage described
how singling out recently freed Blacks, "colored people" in the parlance of the times, by
denying them the right to participate in the administration of justice, is "a brand upon
them," "an assertion of their inferiority," and a "stimulant to... race prejudice." Strauder,
100 U.S. at 308. By using these terms, Justice Strong's opinion was clearly attempting to
connect the denial of Black defendants' rights with the discredited institution of slavery.
Yet Kennedy brazenly revised Strauder's pointed reference to "colored people" by replac-
ing it with the more neutral-sounding "members of a particular race." Powers, 111 S. Ct.
at 1369.
'6, In a key passage, the Court stated that "[a]lthough a defendant has no right to a
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Court apparently was unwilling to risk the radically broad impli-
cations of this theory 162 and it declined to ground its analysis on
the denial of Equal Protection rights to the defendant.
Instead, the Powers Court focused its attention on the harm
to rejected venirepersons caused by their racially motivated exclu-
sion. 163 According to the Court, these excluded venirepersons are
denied the "opportunity to participate in the democratic process"'164
and the security of knowing that by "being part of the judicial
system of the country [they] can prevent its arbitrary use or
abuse.' ' 65 Moreover, such exclusion denies them the sense of
civic-mindedness and the educative benefits that result from jury
service. 166 Accordingly, the Powers Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the exclusion of "otherwise qualified
and unbiased" Black jurors "solely by reason of their race." 167
While "an individual juror does not have the right to sit on any
particular petit jury, . . . he or she does possess the right not to
be excluded from one on account of race."'' 68
By extending the Equal Protection Clause to protect excluded
jurors not present before it, the Court significantly expanded and
altered the rights it had recognized earlier in Batson. As Justice
Scalia noted in his dissent to Powers, Batson never acknowledged
that the Equal Protection rights of potential jurors were implicated
'petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of the defendant's own race,' he or she
does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory
criteria." 111 S. Ct. at 1367 (citations omitted). This language seems to suggest that
defendants would suffer an equal protection violation if potential jurors of any race were
intentionally excluded from the defendant's jury due to racial bias.
162 If criminal defendants could invoke the equal protection clause to challenge discrim-
ination directed at others, other litigants who were collaterally affected by race discrimi-
nation might also utilize the fourteenth amendment. This could permit any plaintiff litigating
the impact of a government service to contest racial discrimination in the provision of that
service. For example, a homeowner situated in a municipal fire district could claim that
the discriminatory hiring of fire department personnel violated his or her equal protection
rights without showing any direct effects from the hiring policy. See generally TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 87, at 119.
163 111 S. Ct. at 1368. The Court also notes the society-wide benefits of jury service,
but it devotes little attention to this point. Id. at 1369 ("jury service preserves the democratic
element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and insures continued acceptance
of the laws by all of the people"). Had the Court been willing to base its decision on the
harm it catalogued as accruing to the community at large, it might have avoided the tortured
standing analysis, see infra at notes 180-209, needed to allow Powers to exercise Black
jurors' rights.
'M Id. at 1369.
'16 Id. at 1368 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922)).
'6 Id. at 1368.
167 Id. at 1370.
16" Id.
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by discriminatory peremptory challenges. 169 Batson only recog-
nized the violation of a Black defendant's Equal Protection rights
by the exclusion of jurors of his or her race from the jury.
More significantly, even after recognizing a Fourteenth
Amendment right for excluded Black jurors, the Powers Court
might still have declined to let white defendants assert that right.
Yet the Court granted such standing to white defendants on a third
party basis. This is particularly interesting given that the Supreme
Court had never recognized this theory of rights before in criminal
litigation. Justice Scalia's dissent pointed out several areas in
which criminal defendants had been expressly prevented from
exercising the rights of third parties, including Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases 170  and Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination 17 1 and confidentiality cases.1 72 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court has held that a criminal defendant may not contest
the denial of another person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
at identification proceedings. 173 In general, these cases are said to
involve purely "personal rights,"' 74 which could be asserted only
by those who have suffered the complained-of violation. Further-
more, several Court opinions have expressed the view that the
exercise of third party rights in the criminal context is inappro-
priate since those rights must be balanced against society's interest
in securing convictions against the guilty. 75 Based on this concern,
the Court has sometimes been reluctant to let a criminal defendant
exercise his or her own rights, let alone those of a third party. 176
Yet the Powers Court readily extended third party standing to a
169 Id. at 1375 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1376 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cases cited). It is well-settled that
a criminal defendant may not object to the illegal search or seizure of a third party, even
when the government proffers the fruit of the illegality as evidence against the defendant.
See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (defendant had no light to object to
search of another's purse); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (defendants could not
object to search of automobile in which they were riding as passengers). See generally
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 154, at 460.
171 111 S. Ct. at 1377 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A criminal defendant cannot rely on a
violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See generally
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 154, at 460-61.
172 A criminal defendant may not exclude testimony or evidence obtained "in violation
of someone else's confidentiality privilege." Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1377 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (cases cited).
113 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 154, at 461.
174 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968)).
175 See WHITE3READ & SLOBOGIN, supra note 108, at 3-4.
176 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (allowing evidentiary use of
statement obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda rights in exigent circumstances).
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white defendant in spite of this long-standing policy. Apparently,
the need for "equality" between Black and white defendants was
more important to the Court than its oft-expressed concern that
the enforcement of procedural rights may allow the guilty to go
free. 177
Although Justice Kennedy presented his opinion as if it con-
formed to prior precedent,1 78 Powers also marked a significant shift
in the Court's treatment of the issue of jury discrimination. Pre-
viously, the Supreme Court had always focused on the denial of
Equal Protection rights to the defendant as the grounds for allow-
ing him or her to seek to overturn a conviction due to discrimi-
nation in the jury selection process. 79 Moreover, the Court had
always viewed its Equal Protection cases as addressing a partic-
ular, concrete problem-the use of the criminal process to oppress
Blacks-and had shaped its remedies accordingly. In Powers, how-
ever, the Court shifted its focus from the needs of minority defen-
dants to the demands of colorblind constitutionalism. As a result,
the oppression of Blacks is acknowledged only as a convenient
rationale for the extension of previously unexercised rights to
whites.
2. The White Use of Black Rights
The centerpiece of Powers is its grant of third party standing
to white defendants, permitting them to litigate the Equal Protec-
tion rights of excluded Black jurors.1 80 Drawing on civil third party
"n The unique outcome of the standing issue in Powers could possibly be justified on
the grounds that race discrimination injury selection must be treated differently than rights
violations which take place in the gathering of evidence, since it casts doubt on the
legitimacy of the proceedings. See 111 S. Ct. at 1365. Yet, this explanation is not wholly
satisfactory because the Court has done nothing in other contexts when the integrity of the
judicial process was threatened. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)
(permitting introduction of coerced confessions to be evaluated under harmless error stan-
dard, and rejecting argument that reliance on coerced confessions offends the integrity of
the courts).
'7 See Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine, 59 TENN. L.
REV. 1, 5-6 (1991) (arguing that in fourth amendment cases, the Rehnquist Court habitually
feigns adherence to earlier traditions in order to mask its creation of entirely new doctrine).
179 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
,80 Given the outcome of the case, it seems strange that the Court did not mention the
central role of the Black juror when it described the issues under consideration. 111 S. Ct.
at 1367 (stating the question of the case as "whether, based on the Equal Protection Clause,
a white defendant may object to the prosecution's peremptory challenges of black
venirepersons").
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standing doctrines, the Court declared that white defendants may
exercise Batson challenges as proxies for excluded Black jurors.
A cursory glance at the related case law, however, reveals that
the Court applied its third party standing test much less stringently
in Powers than usual.
Generally, a third party litigant must meet three criteria in
order to obtain standing. First, the litigant must have suffered an
"injury-in-fact.' 181 Second, the litigant must have a "close relation"
to the third party.182 Finally, it must be difficult for the third party
to protect his or her own interests. 83 The Court held in Powers
that white defendants meet all three criteria when protesting the
exclusion of Black jurors. First, the Court found that a white
defendant suffered an injury-in-fact from the improper exclusion
of Black venirepersons because such exclusion "'casts doubt on
the integrity of the judicial process,' and places the fairness of a
criminal proceeding in doubt."'184 Next, the Court found that the
voir dire process establishes a "relation, if not a bond of trust"
between white defendants and excluded Black jurors 85 and that
both of these parties may lose faith in the judicial process if the
defendant is unable to object to an instance of racial discrimination
at trial. 86 Finally, the Court found that it would be procedurally
awkward, time-consuming and expensive for an excluded venire-
person to bring a suit protesting his or her exclusion. 8 7 Even taken
together, however, these findings provide little justification for
extending third party standing to white criminal defendants.
As an initial matter, the Powers Court glossed over the first
and most significant element in the test for third party standing:
the "injury-in-fact" requirement. This element is intended to pre-
vent unnecessary or premature decisions on constitutional issues18 8
and ensure that the litigant "properly ... frame[s] the issues and
181 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 1371 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
115 Id. at 1372.
18 Id. The Court also found that the relation between excluded Black jurors and white
defendants is no more tenuous than other relationships found sufficient to support third
party standing claims in prior cases. Id.
187 Id. at 1373.
183 Professor Brilmayer refers to this standing rationale as the policy in favor of re-
straint. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III. Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297, 302 (1979) [hereinafter Brilmayer,
Article II1]. See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 87, at 136.
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present[s] them with the necessary adversarial zeal."'189 Yet, rather
than requiring Powers to assert an "injury-in-fact" to himself, the
Court imported new terminology into its standing analysis by ask-
ing whether he had suffered a "cognizable injury" °90 from the
prosecution's exclusion of African-Americans by peremptory chal-
lenge. Thus, the Court focused on the possibility of injury to the
defendant rather than actual injury.191
The key to Justice Kennedy's reluctance to find a direct injury
to Powers lies in the implications of finding such an injury. The
Court could have found at least two instances of direct injury to
white defendants when prosecutors exclude Blacks from their jur-
ies, but recognizing either one would have undermined Justice
Kennedy's colorblind agenda. First, the Court could have ac-
knowledged that white defendants suffer injury when Blacks are
excluded from their juries because Black jurors are less likely to
convict than whites. 192 Of course, this reality flies in the face of
the Court's contrived assumption that race makes no difference.
In any event, the Court would be loath to permit a criminal defen-
dant to claim a right not to be convicted. Alternatively, the Court
could have placed greater emphasis on the harm to white defen-
dants that results when race discrimination occurs in the judicial
process. A racially motivated acquittal does not fully exonerate a
defendant and a racially motivated conviction is even more objec-
tionable. But recognizing harms of this sort would make it difficult
for the Court to ignore the impact of societal discrimination on
individual civil rights plaintiffs-white or Black. If Powers could
complain of the derivative impact of discrimination directed at
189 Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 956
(1984).
190 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1371.
191 Justice Scalia referred to this as an "injury in perception" standard. Id. at 1379
(Scalia, J., dissenting). See Christopher T. Wilson, Powers v. Ohio: Race-BasedPeremptory
Challenges, 40 KAN. L. REV. 219 (1992) (criticizing Powers for extending third party
standing in the absence of an injury-in-fact to white defendant).
192 See Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 17, at 1626-34. See also Frank P. Wil-
liams & Marilyn D. McShane, Inclinations of Prospective Jurors in Capital Cases, 74(2)
Soc. & SOCIAL RESEARCH 85 (1990) (Black jurors more likely to acquit white defendants
than white jurors); J.L. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and that
ofJurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 103, 109 (1979) (rate of acquittal
of white defendants increased as number of Black jurors increased); Dale W. Broeder, The
Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 20 (Blacks tend to acquit criminal defendants regardless
of the defendants' race at higher rate than whites). But see Johnson, Black Innocence,
supra note 17, at 1697 (some mock jury studies show Black jurors treat white defendants
much the same way that white jurors treat Black defendants).
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others, so might plaintiffs in a variety of other civil rights
contexts. 193
At first blush, the "third party difficulty" factor provides a
compelling reason for allowing a white defendant to champion the
Batson rights of excluded Black venirepersons. Upon closer ex-
amination, however, even that rationale is flawed. Extending
standing to a white defendant in Powers required the Court to
sidestep one of the central concerns of its third party standing
test, namely, the desire of third parties not to enforce their rights.'94
To reach its decision, the Court had to assume that a juror ex-
cluded due to racial discrimination would deviate from the natural
inclination of jurors to avoid jury service in most cases.' 95 This
assumption might have been reasonable in two of the cases the
Powers Court relied on 196 to meet this prong of the standing test,
Vasquez v. Hillery97 and Rose v. Mitchell. 98 However, the ex-
cluded jurors in those cases may well have believed that they
needed to remain on the jury to protect a member of their own
race from a racially motivated conviction, an explanation that does
not apply to Powers.
The most mystifying part of the Court's standing analysis is
its conclusion that a "close relation" existed between Powers and
the excluded Black jurors. As the Court itself noted, the presence
of a relationship is only germane to the question of standing to the
extent that it ensures that the litigant is "fully, or very nearly, as
effective a proponent of the right as the [third party]."1 99 Notwith-
standing the Court's claims to the contrary, the relationship be-
tween a criminal defendant and the jurors trying his or her case is
far less substantial than those recognized in earlier third-party
193 See supra note 162.
194 See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 87, at 136; Brilmayer, Article III,
supra note 188 (defining the right to "self-determination" as the right of the third party to
decide when and when not to exercise rights).
195 See PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 85 (1984)
(60% of jury pool members actively seek to avoid jury service); JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY
SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS
111 (1977) (most people consider jury service "a nuisance," and approximately 60% seek
to be excused).
"9 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
l9 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (Latino defendant's conviction overturned due to racially dis-
criminatory exclusion of Latinos from grand jury).
'- 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (discriminatory exclusion of Blacks from grand jury service was
grounds for reversal of Black defendant's conviction).
'9 Powers, 11 S. Ct. at 1372 (citation omitted).
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standing cases, 200 such as doctor-patient 2 1 or vendor-vendee
relationships. 202
Unlike a doctor-patient relationship, for example, the "bond
of trust" which supposedly exists between criminal defendants and
jurors does not provide an independent motivation for the defen-
dant to act in the best interests of jurors. The obligation to care
for patients is inherent in a doctor's role. The same cannot be said
about the defendant's relationship with a member of the venire.
Admittedly, a criminal defendant may seek to vigorously litigate
an Equal Protection violation, since "discrimination in the jury
selection process may lead to the reversal of a conviction. '20 3 But
this is precisely the point: the defendant will be motivated primar-
ily by the desire to go free, not the desire to do racial justice or
to vindicate the rights of excluded jurors. Moreover, even assum-
ing that both defendants and excluded jurors desire to eliminate
racial discrimination from trial, this says nothing about their re-
spective conceptions of what race discrimination is and how best
to fight it, concerns that go to the heart of the standing require-
ment. 20 4 Thus, the defendant-juror relationship, standing alone,
provides no assurance that the defendant will properly present and
argue the equal protection issues raised in the case. 20 5
Not only is there little reason to expect that white defendants
will make trustworthy fiduciaries of Black Equal Protection rights,
there is reason to think just the opposite. The central assumption
The Court offers Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) and U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990) as examples of
cases where the litigant was in close relation to the third party, permitting assertion of the
third party's rights. 111 S. Ct. at 1372.
201 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481 (physicians offering birth control advice were in a "con-
fidential" and "professional" relationship with patients).
202 Craig, 429 U.S. at 195 (shared purpose made beer distributor effective litigant for
equal protection clause challenge to statute by 18- to 20-year-old males). Vendors are
effective litigants of the rights of vendees because both wish to ensure the vendees' access
to the seller's product. There is no similar common end driving defendants and jurors to
seek the same outcome from litigation.
203 Powers, Ill S. Ct. at 1372.
2' See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) ("courts depend on effective
advocacy, and therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective
advocates of those rights are before them"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (purpose
of standing is to "assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court . .. depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions").
25 In any event, this rationale of seeking to obtain a reversal of one's conviction does
not explain sufficiently why white defendants should be permitted to make Batson chal-
lenges at trial, prior to conviction and prior to the need to explore all possible means of
obtaining reversal.
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of the Court's standing analysis in Powers was that "[b]oth the
excluded juror and the criminal defendant have a common interest
in eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom. '2 6 In
other words, the Court felt that a white defendant would not
harbor, or at least would not act upon, racist sentiments against
Blacks. As desirable a state of affairs as that might be, the available
evidence suggests that, at present, it is little more than a naive
judicial fantasy. Virtually every public opinion survey, sociological
study and political indicator shows that white animus toward peo-
ple of African descent is persistent and widespread. 2 7 Thus, the
Court's decision in Powers placed the well-being of the Black
community in the hands of white criminal defendants and their
attorneys, who, generally speaking, have little or no concern for
the elimination of racial discrimination from the courthouse. In
essence, the Court has set foxes to guard the chicken coop.
Powers' third party standing arrangement clearly privileges
white interests over Black. White defendants may rely on Black
Equal Protection rights to avoid a conviction, but they need ex-
ercise this right only when it is to their benefit to do so.2 18 Con-
sequently, permitting white defendants to represent the interests
of Black venirepersons silences Black voices and allows white
defendants to shape Equal Protection jurisprudence according to
their needs. 20 9 Thus, while white defendants are free to exploit the
rights of Black citizens, adequate litigation of the Equal Protection
rights of potential Black jurors becomes less likely.
B. Georgia v. McCollum
Given Powers v. Ohio's ostensible focus on the civil rights of
excluded Black jurors, the case of Georgia v. McColum210 follows
"6 111 S. Ct. at 1372.
m See generally A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 64, at 113-56.
m Cf. BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 119, at 46-50, 646-47 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining
his "racial interest-convergence" principle).
209 Judge Wyzanski's critique of a decision permitting white labor officials to represent
Black workers' interests is apropos here:
Suppression, intentional or otherwise, of the presentation of non-white claims
cannot be tolerated in our society .... In presenting non-white issues non-whites
cannot, against their will, be relegated to white spokesmen, mimicking black men.
The day of the minstrel show is over.
Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wyzanski,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
210 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
Rights Held Hostage
logically. In McCollum, the Court held that white defendants may
not use their peremptory challenges to intentionally exclude Black
jurors on the basis of their race. At first glance, this holding
appears to protect Black interests. However, a colorblind exten-
sion of McCollum (which appears likely) could contribute to the
continued subjugation of Blacks through the criminal justice sys-
tem. One can easily imagine a future case denying a Black defen-
dant the use of peremptory challenges to exclude white jurors,
even though the defendant made these challenges in an effort to
prevent a racist conviction. Such a result would undermine the
underlying purpose of Batson-providing Black defendants with
fair trials.
1. Defendants as State Actors, Prosecutors as Proxies
Unlike Powers, where all the major players were white, Geor-
gia v. McCollum involved white defendants charged with attacking
and beating two African-Americans. 21 ' Because the prosecution
intended to show that the race of the victims was a factor in the
alleged assault,212 it was anxious to prevent the discriminatory
exclusion of potential African-American jurors. Pursuant to Bat-
son, the prosecution sought an order from the trial court which
would have required the defendants to articulate a racially neutral
reason for the peremptory challenge of a Black juror once the
prosecution established a prima facie case of discrimination. 21 3 The
trial court denied the prosecution's request and the Georgia Su-
preme Court affirmed. 214
The United States Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion
written by Justice Blackmun, the Court held that criminal defen-
dants may not intentionally use peremptory challenges to strike
potential jurors due to their race. 215 The Court merged the reason-
ing it had reached in two prior cases, Powers and Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co.,21 6 to find that discrimination by criminal
211 Id. at 2351.
212 As another indication of the racial factors present in the case, the Court noted that
a leaflet referring to the assault and urging a boycott of the defendants' business was
"widely distributed in the local African-American community." Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 2352.
215 Id. at 2359.
216 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that civil litigants could not exercise peremptory
challenges in racially discriminatory manner).
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defendants was "state action 217 and that prosecutors had standing
to contest the defense's racially discriminatory use of the peremp-
tory challenge on behalf of excluded jurors. 218
Although criminal defendants-unlike the civil litigants in Ed-
monson-are themselves beneficiaries of constitutional protec-
tion,219 the Court concluded that none of the procedural rights
afforded to defendants enable them to escape the Constitution's
prohibition against racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges. 220 The Court explicitly held that the prohibition of the
exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges does not violate
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel,221 nor does it violate a defendant's right to trial by an
impartial jury.222
2. The Cost of McCollum: Dealing with Discrimination by
Denying Oppression
Undoubtedly, when confined to its facts, McCollum makes a
significant contribution toward greater racial justice in the criminal
justice system. As a result of McCollum, white defendants are less
able to exclude Black jurors from trials with racial implications.
Had the Court ruled otherwise, not only Black jurors but also
Black victims and the Black community at large would have
suffered. 223
217 McCoIlum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-55. The Court noted that criminal defendants engage
in a traditional government function--"the selection of an impartial trier of fact"--when
they exercise their allotted peremptory challenges. Id. at 2355 (citing Edmonson, 111 S.
Ct. at 2083). In addition, the "harmful effects of the private litigant's discriminatory act"
are aggravated and intensified by the authority of the state. Id. at 2356.
218 Id. at 2357. The Court found that the state suffered a cognizable injury from the
exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges, that the state had a close relation to the
excluded venirepersons, and that the "barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting."
Id. (quoting Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373). In this, McCollum surpasses even Powers' poorly
considered standing analysis. It is difficult to envision the state as a legitimate proxy for
the rights of Black venirepersons since, prior to McCollum, the entire thrust of the Supreme
Court's jury selection case law was to seek to eliminate purposeful state discrimination.
See Swain, 380 U.S. 202, 234-35 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (noting complicity of state
prosecuting attorney in the intentional exclusion of Blacks from jury service).
219 Id. at 2357-58.
220 Id. at 2358.
221 Id. at 2358.
2 Id. at 2358-59.
The Rodney King trial is one example of how the criminal justice system may be
employed to subjugate African-Americans. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
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The problem with McCollum, however, lies in the Supreme
Court's determined effort to elicit a general antidiscrimination rule
from the case. Recharacterizing its prior decisions from Strauder
onward, the McCollum Court constructed a history of rigidly co-
lorblind jury selection jurisprudence. "Over the last century,"
wrote Justice Blackmun, "this Court gradually has abolished race
as a consideration for jury service." 224 Whenever he addressed the
issue of racial discrimination, Justice Blackmun spoke in generic
terms only, making no distinction between discrimination directed
against whites and that directed against subjugated minorities. 225
In absolute colorblind fashion, the Court concluded that
"[r]egardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there
can be no doubt that the harm is the same-in all cases, the juror
is subjected to open and public racial discrimination. '226
Using general antidiscrimination language in this way blocks
attempts to fashion appropriate, color-conscious remedies to racial
injustice. Yet, the reasons the Court gave for allowing the prose-
cutor in McCollum to contest the defense's use of peremptory
challenges belie the need for a colorblind remedy:
One of the goals of our jury system is "to impress upon
the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that
the verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accor-
dance with the law by persons who are fair." Selection
procedures that purposefully exclude African-Americans
from juries undermine that public confidence-as well
they should.227
But does the purposeful exclusion of a suspected racist by a mem-
ber of a racial minority seeking to avoid racial subjugation "un-
dermine ... public confidence" in the verdict? The only logical
answer is no. Even Justice O'Connor, ordinarily a strong propo-
nent of colorblind constitutionalism, noted in dissent that "the
214 112 S. Ct. at 2352.
225 See, e.g., id. at 2351, 52, 53. At one point, Blackmun's opinion acknowledged that
"[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude African-Americans from juries undermine
the public confidence," id. at 2353-54, but it made no further mention of specific racial
background when discussing racial discrimination. Later, the Court specifically rejected an
interpretation of its holding that would have permitted Black defendants to peremptorily
challenge white jurors due to suspected racial prejudice. Id. at 2358-59.
m Id. at 2353.
27 Id. at 2353-54 (quoting Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372) (citations omitted).
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Court's holding may fail to advance nondiscriminatory criminal
justice," since "[u]sing peremptory challenges to secure minority
representation on the jury may help to overcome.., racial bias. '228
In the messy racial landscape of America's courtrooms, "[tihe
ability to use peremptory challenges to exclude majority race mem-
bers may be crucial to empaneling a fair jury. '229
Unfortunately, the McCollum majority rejected the argument
that Black defendants should be able to peremptorily challenge
white jurors whom they suspect are racially biased. The Court
acknowledged that "a defendant has the right to an impartial jury
that can view him without racial animus,' 230 but it insisted that
Black defendants have to avail themselves of the limited remedy
provided by Ham v. South Carolina231 to remove "those on the
venire whom the defendant has specific reason to believe would
be incapable of confronting and suppressing their racism" 23 2 and
forego the use of the peremptory challenge for this purpose.233
The Court paints with too broad a brush when it categorizes
any diversion from formal equality as "racially discriminatory."
Whether the exclusion of a juror is "racially discriminatory" or
not turns on whether the defendant and the excluded juror share
racial identity and whether race plays a role in the trial. McCollum,
because it does not take notice of this fact, bodes ill for future
jury selection cases involving Black defendants.
221 Id. at 2364.
29 Id. (quoting Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae 9-10). Justice Thomas makes the same point in his concurring opinion. Id. at 2360
(Thomas, J., concurring).
230 Id. at 2358.
1' 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (requiring trial court to interrogate prospective jurors on the
subject of race prejudice during trial of Black civil rights worker). The remedy in Ham is
"limited" because even in those instances where a defendant is permitted to ask whether
jurors are prejudiced against Black people, the juror can only be removed if he or she gives
a response sufficiently biased that it would justify a challenge for cause. In practice, this
would require an egregious statement and allow jurors who harbor less overt, but equally
dangerous, racist sentiments to pass. See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[u]nless jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire, defendants generally
must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will affect the verdict").
232 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358-59.
2 But see id. at 2359 ("[T]here is a distinction between exercising a peremptory
challenge to discriminate invidiously against jurors on account of race and exercising a
peremptory challenge to remove an individual juror who harbors racial prejudice"). Ap-
parently, the majority believed a defendant could legitimately exercise a peremptory strike
against a juror the defendant believed to be racist. However, since courts have not been
sympathetic to claims of racism by Black defendants contesting the use of the prosecution's
peremptory challenges, there is little reason to believe that Black defendants will be any
more successful in convincing trial judges that a particular juror is racist.
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IV. The Consequences of Colorblindness
Powers and McCollum ignore how the impact of race actually
affects the trial process, an approach that is both ahistorical and
acontextual. The Court presumes in these cases that white and
Black defendants are similarly situated and that racism affects
them in the same fashion and in equal measure. But discrimination
affects different actors differently, and the race of the defendant
is a key variable in determining whether discriminatory jury selec-
tion distorts the function of the trial. By failing to acknowledge
these factors, the Supreme Court ignores and perpetuates the racial
oppression of Blacks in the criminal justice system.
A. Black Defendants and the Reality of Racism
The most obvious target of racial oppression in the jury se-
lection process is the Black defendant. Trial before a racially
biased jury is an unfortunate, but all too common, experience for
Black defendants.2 4 Racially biased juries may harm Black defen-
dants in a number of ways. Black defendants may become victims
of both conscious and unconscious racial bias on the part of ju-
rors-either of which can result in an unwarranted conviction. An
unwarranted conviction also may result when, due to the under-
representation of Blacks, a jury wrongly interprets data crucial to
the outcome of the trial. In addition to the danger of an incorrect
result, the Black defendant may suffer symbolic and psychic harm
as a result of the underrepresentation of Black jurors. These latter
forms of race-based harm may not necessarily implicate the ve-
racity of the verdict, but they do provide cause for concern for
reasons related to fairness and due process of law.
The most dramatic type of juror bias is conscious racism:
intentional, racially motivated conduct. 235 In terms of the conduct
of jurors, conscious racism involves deliberately voting for guilt
or finding a fact adverse to a Black defendant as a consequence
of consciously known and deliberately chosen racist sentiments.
2 See generally Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 17, at 1616-49 (reviewing data
from criminal trials, mock jury experiments, and general research on race prejudice that
suggest jurors "will judge the defendant more harshly if he is [B]lack than if he is white").
235 Cf., Charles Lawrence HI, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rnv. 317, 322 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, Uncon-
scious Racism].
1993]
108 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 28
Evidence suggests that there must be a critical mass of non-racist 236
Black jurors for Black defendants to avoid the effects of conscious
racism and receive a fair trial.237 Given the prevalence of racial
bias in the community-at-large, 238 there is a great likelihood that
at least one person who is biased against Blacks will be seated on
any particular jury.239 In a close case, this one juror could prevent
a deserved acquittal or secure an unjust conviction. More gener-
ally, the presence of one or more racists may affect group dynamics
in the jury room. In both of these circumstances, then, the defen-
dant has a critical need for one or more Black jurors to be on hand
to counteract conscious racism. Consequently, any act which re-
duces the probability of including the highest possible number of
Blacks on a jury harms the Black defendant.
Unconscious racial discrimination may be just as damaging to
the Black defendant as conscious racism. Non-Black jurors may
decide against a Black defendant, not out of a deliberate intent to
harm, but because they are responding to unconsciously held be-
liefs regarding the inferiority or criminal nature of Blacks .240 Jurors
236 Black jurors may themselves harbor racial prejudice towards other Blacks, an
occurrence of more frequency than one might suspect. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("members of minority groups frequently respond
to discrimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group,
even to the point of adopting the majority's negative attitudes toward the minority");
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 150-53 (1954); E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER,
BLACK BOURGEOISIE 213-16 (1957); GERALD SIMPSON & JOHN YINGER, RACIAL AND
CULTURAL MINORITIES 192-95, 227, 295 (4th ed. 1972). While prevalent, the possibility of
Black-on-Black racism does not obviate the need to ensure the presence of Black jurors in
the trials of Black defendants. Studies indicate that such racial self-destructiveness is far
less probable than racism from white jurors. Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 17, at
1698, n.462 (citing authorities).
237 Sheri Johnson argues convincingly that, in order to prevent convictions based on
racial prejudice, a defendant should be entitled to three "racially similar jurors" on his or
her jury. Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 17, at 1698-99. See also Colbert, Chal-
lenging the Challenge, supra note 90, at 110-15 ("[tlhe results in . . . jury experiments
suggest that the influence of race is minimized when an all-white jury is replaced by one
that is racially mixed"); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1472, 1559-60 (1988).
28 See A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 64, at 138-48, 155. See also Ian Ayres, Fair
Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV.
817 (1991) (showing car salespersons unwilling to negotiate prices with Black buyers that
were as favorable as prices offered white males).
239 The inclusion of a racially biased juror need not be the product of intentional
discrimination on the part of the prosecution, nor the result of its exercise of its peremptory
challenges. Such a juror could survive the selection process by not answering questions
truthfully or via the ineptitude of defense counsel.
24 Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 235, at 343-44; Johnson, Black Inno-
cence, supra note 20, at 1644-47; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016 (1988).
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acting in this way will not admit to being swayed by racism241 (and
therefore will be difficult to identify at voir dire), yet they will
nonetheless let their biases affect their decisions. For example, an
unconsciously biased juror may be less likely to believe that sex
between a Black man and a white woman was consensual, 242 that
a Black man was in a predominantly white neighborhood "just for
a walk, ' 243 or that a Black woman dressed in a sequined gown and
high heels was not soliciting prostitution. 244 As in the case of
conscious discrimination, the underrepresentation of Black jurors
increases the chances that a jury whose members harbor subli-
mated racial animus will victimize the Black defendant. 245
Another potential harm to Black defendants caused by the
underrepresentation of Black jurors is the defendant's trial by a
jury that lacks the information to resolve the case fairly. In certain
cases, juries will need representatives from the Black community
who can provide interpretations of data based on Black culture. 24 6
Examples of the harm engendered by jury information deprivation
include the inability to translate Black English into standard
English247 or to determine, when relevant, whether the conduct of
a defendant was reasonable or unreasonable in a self-defense or
resisting arrest case. 248 This is not to say that whites are inherently
incapable of understanding Black life and culture. The different
outcomes reached by Black and white jurors result from the lack
of information, and whites can certainly understand the Black
perspective if they are given access to informed teachers.
241 See sources cited supra note 240.
I2 A common stereotype exists that Blacks are far more promiscuous and "oversexed"
than whites. One who unconsciously believed this stereotype would find it more plausible
for the Black man to desire the white woman than for the white woman to desire the Black
man. See generally, WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 32-40 (1968); JESSE WALTER DEES, JR. & JAMES S.
HADLEY, JIM CROW 11-22 (1951); WILLIS D. WEATHERFORD & CHARLES S. JOHNSON,
RACE RELATIONS: ADJUSTMENT OF WHITES AND NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES 60,
230-31 (1934) (copies on ffile at University of Florida main library).
243 Cf., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
24 Again, the stereotype of Black promiscuity is at work here.
245 Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 17, at 1698; Colbert, Challenging the Chal-
lenge, supra note 90, at 112.
246 Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1472, 1559 (1988).2
1
7 Id. at 1559; VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 138-40 (1986).
241 A properly informed jury might decide that fear of police officers in a particular
community rendered a defendant's refusal to obey a police order reasonable, or that conduct
which whites would not regard as threatening appeared threatening to the defendant.
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Given the existence of conscious racism, unconscious racism
and the possibility of juror ignorance, racially discriminatory per-
emptory challenges are a harm to the Black defendant whether or
not they actually result in a guilty verdict. Where Blacks are
already a minority of the population, each exercise of a strike is
an independent source of race-based harm. Even if the result is
not an all-white jury or a jury on which the numbers of Blacks can
be said to be underrepresented, each strike is discriminatory be-
cause it lessens the probability that Blacks will be on the jury,
thus increasing the probability of a biased jury and decreasing the
probability that a cross-section of community values will be fairly
represented. Given the history of racism in this country and the
history of the use of the jury to enforce that racism, a jury that
underrepresents Blacks is inexcusable.
Black defendants also may suffer what I call "symbolic harm"
when tried before juries on which Blacks are underrepresented.
"Symbolic harm" results when Black defendants are treated in
ways that demonstrate their subjugated status and suggest their
inferiority. Black defendants may be harmed symbolically in a
variety of ways.
First, underrepresentation of Blacks causes symbolic harm to
the extent that it derogates from the democratic values that the
jury system is supposed to embody and uphold. One purpose of
the jury trial is to provide a voice for the people to counter-balance
the power of the state. 249 The jury as an institution affirms the
principle that the adjudication of rights and imposition of punish-
ment should be a democratic process. What, then, is the implica-
tion if Blacks are underrepresented on the jury? Instead of an
example of democracy at work, a jury which contains no Blacks
or only a token number of Blacks displays what De Tocqueville
condemned as the "tyranny of the majority."5 0
The word "tyranny" begins to describe the second kind of
symbolic harm suffered by Black defendants. Besides being simply
a numerical majority, whites on the whole have more money,
higher social status and greater access to power than do Blacks.
The trial of a Black person before an all-white jury gives the
appearance of a privileged elite passing judgment over the fate of
249 See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 247 at 248.
710 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA VOLUME 1 269-71 (Vintage
Paperback ed. 1976).
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an inferior. At the symbolic level, the jury is no longer a neutral
institution but one controlled, dominated and possessed by whites.
In the racial turf war being played out behind the scenes of our
criminal justice system,251 each component of the trial process is
replete with meaning. A jury on which African-Americans are
seriously underrepresented indicates that the defendant is on white
turf. Stricken Black jurors reinforce this image of Black power-
lessness and dependency.
In addition to these symbolic harms, Blacks may suffer a
related psychic harm when they observe a racially biased use of
the peremptory challenge system. To the Black defendant looking
at a jury panel which contains only one or two Blacks, the sight
of those Blacks being removed through peremptory challenge
could understandably cause a sense of alarm. Given the milieu of
racial oppression that pervades American society, a Black defen-
dant subjected to discriminatory jury selection suffers psychic
harm, a real, palpable, and categorizable form of fear akin to the
fear generated by an assault.252 The nature of the race-based harm
in this instance is no different than that engendered were the
prosecutor to address the defendant by a racial slur.253 Further-
more, this harm is not limited to the defendant. Black venireper-
sons also may feel that they have suffered through a racist assault.
251 Although conscious racism in the jury context may sometimes be the result of the
bias of some individuals against other individuals, as a political matter the jury has been
used by one community of people as an instrument of oppression against another community
of people. Racial bias cannot be seen as just an individual matter and jury bias cannot be
solved simply by focusing on individuals.
2s2 This fear is no different than the apprehension many Blacks feel, for example, upon
walking into a bar in, say, South Boston and noticing that they are the only Blacks in the
place, or that many whites may feel when they are left alone in an elevator with three or
four Blacks. While such moments of apprehension may be an unavoidable part of life in a
multi-ethnic, but still racially divided society, they should not be permitted to invade the
halls of justice. See Fla. Sup. Ct. Comm., Report, supra note 148, at 7 ("courts must
remain the place where the injured can seek refuge without fear of being devoured by the
serpent of hatred").
25 See Man Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320, 2336-38 (1989) (describing emotional and physical harm
from racial slurs). There is much debate over whether racist speech should be considered
a crime. I take no position on that issue here since both sides in the debate recognize that
racial slurs do in fact harm the target. Compare Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can
Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilem-
mas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 333 (1991) and Kathryn Marie
Dessayer, Leaving Them Speechless: A Critique of Speech Restrictions on Campus, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 565 (1991) vith Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982).
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Ultimately, the peremptory challenge of Black jurors reduces the
faith that Blacks have in the trial, reduces the legitimacy of the
legal system as a whole, and obscures any moral lessons of just
retribution or deterrence that the Black defendant's conviction
would otherwise illustrate.
B. The New Politics of Race
The Supreme Court's recent endorsement of colorblind phi-
losophy in Powers and McCollum cannot be viewed in historical
isolation. The approach of these cases deviates from a hundred-
year tradition of concern for the plight of the Black defendant.
However, if untrue to one historical tradition, Powers and Mc-
Collum have coincided with a more recent trend. Since the 1970s,
there has been a general "white backlash" against affirmative ac-
tion programs. 254 Much of this backlash has been fueled by concern
for so-called "innocent whites," supposedly victimized by race-
conscious affirmative action remedies.255 Part of the Reagan Ad-
ministration's pledge to "get the government off the backs of the
people" was a thinly veiled promise to gut affirmative action pro-
grams .256 The adoption of colorblind constitutionalism, while per-
haps motivated by different concerns, clearly furthers the political
agenda of the neo-conservative right257 by defending and preserv-
ing white privilege.258 Regulating the exercise of the peremptory
challenge through colorblind procedures allocates rights and ben-
efits in a way that privileges the interests of whites and permits
the continued racial subjugation of Blacks.
Colorblind remedies for jury selection discrimination have
limited effectiveness in eliminating racial subjugation. While help-
ful in their limited applications, Powers and McCollum fall far
short of what is required to eliminate the impact of race on criminal
jury trials. Both cases perpetuate the status quo by diverting at-
tention and resources from corrective race-conscious solutions.
2'4 MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION, supra note 32, at 152.
25 See Frances Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 992, 1010-11 (1989).
216 See Robert Detlefsen, Civil Rights Under Reagan 3 (1991).
2 See id. at 4.
21 One reason why colorblindness is the political ideology of choice of the neoconser-
vative right may be because it preserves white privilege without the negative moral con-
notations associated with blatant white supremacy as espoused by George Wallace and
Strom Thurmond in their heyday and, more recently, David Duke.
Rights Held Hostage
Moreover, they actually pose potential threats to Black interests.
As a result of Powers, the Equal Protection rights of Black veni-
repersons have been placed in the hands of untrustworthy fiduci-
aries. An extension of McCollum could easily deprive Black de-
fendants of one of the most useful means of defending themselves
from racial harm-the ability to peremptorily challenge white
venirepersons.
Racial subjugation through the criminal process must be elim-
inated first, before colorblind jury selection procedures may be
profitably implemented. A jury selection process that does not
account for the racial subjugation of African-Americans will permit
it to continue.
V. Seeking a Race-Conscious Remedy to the Jury Selection
Problem
An anti-subjugation solution to the problem of race discrimi-
nation in the selection of juries would, of necessity, have three
key elements. First, it would address the traditional concern re-
garding the racially discriminatory use of the peremptory chal-
lenge. That is, it would prevent prosecutors from using their per-
emptory challenges to reduce the numbers of Black venirepersons
so that a Black defendant would be tried before a disproportion-
ately white jury. Second, the remedy would prevent white defen-
dants, in appropriate cases, from utilizing their peremptory chal-
lenges to remove Black jurors. Finally, a race-conscious jury
discrimination remedy would avoid the flaw in the Powers-Mc-
Collum approach by permitting Black defendants to use the per-
emptory challenge to strike prospective jurors whom they suspect
are racist and to strike white jurors in order to increase the like-
lihood of seating a Black juror at trial.
Such a race-conscious jury selection remedy would not be
entirely unfamiliar to Supreme Court jurisprudence and would not
require major changes in Equal Protection doctrine. Batson v.
Kentucky259 already stands for the proposition that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause forbids the exclusion of Black jurors from the trials
of Black defendants on racially motivated grounds (its major flaw
being that it makes it too difficult for a defendant to prove that a
-9 476 U.S. 79 (1985).
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prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a Black juror was indeed
racially motivated).260 The Court's requirement of shared racial
identity between the defendant and the excluded juror demon-
strates that Batson is directed toward eliminating the racial sub-
jugation of African-American defendants. As a result, nothing in
Batson forbids Black defendants from using the peremptory chal-
lenge to strike white jurors.
The case of Ristaino v. Ross 261 provides an easy alternative
to the remedy currently evolved from Powers and McCollum. 262
In Ristaino, the Supreme Court decided that a trial court must
accede to a defense request to inquire as to ajuror's racial attitudes
during voir dire whenever there is a "significant likelihood that
racial prejudice might infect [the] trial. '263 If the Supreme Court
considers trial courts able to determine when a "significant likeli-
hood that racial prejudice might infect the trial" exists for purposes
of conducting voir dire, it ought to consider these courts competent
to make a similar inquiry for deciding when the peremptory chal-
lenge of potential Black jurors would violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
The best way to prevent the discriminatory use of the per-
emptory challenge for racial subjugation would be to prohibit its
use for removing potential Black jurors from the venire in a crim-
inal trial whenever there is a significant likelihood that racial issues
might affect the trial.264 This remedy, based on Ristaino's language,
is narrowly tailored to prevent the racial subjugation of African-
Americans through the criminal process. Racial subjugation is the
20 See supra, notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
-' 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
262 See Colbert, Challenging the Challenge, supra note 90, at 120-25. Professor Colbert
reaches a similar conclusion as to the appropriate remedy, advocating the abolition of
peremptory challenges in "race-sensitive" cases based on the unconstitutionality of "all
badges and incidents of slavery .... Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
m Id. at 598. Of course, one might doubt the ability of a court to determine when a
"significant likelihood" exists. Indeed, the Ristaino Court held that there was no such
"significant likelihood," despite the fact that the case involved Black defendants on trial
for violent crimes against a white security guard. Id. at 597. However, the "racial issues"
standard proposed infra, notes 264-275 and accompanying text, would bring Ristaino
automatically within its scope, given the defendants' race.
2 A test worded in this manner sets forth a less stringent standard than that in Ristaino.
"Racial prejudice" implies that there must be some active dislike, which the term "infects"
equates to a disease. The problem with the "disease model" of racial prejudice is that it
requires the court to focus on identifying carriers of the disease who exhibit some de-
monstrable form of animus toward African-Americans. Concentrating on the absence or
presence of "racial issues" should direct the court's inquiry away from the value choices
of individual jurors or groups ofjurors and instead highlight the factual context of the case.
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harm that results from the use of the peremptory challenge to
strike Black venirepersons, a fact which Batson recognized with-
out resolving265 and which Powers and McCollum later simply
ignored. 266 Prohibiting the use of the peremptory challenge when
racial issues pervade the trial would prevent the challenge when
racial subjugation is most likely to result. Such a prohibition would
also eliminate the need to litigate whether each peremptory chal-
lenge of a Black venireperson was made with a racially discrimi-
natory motivation.
This prophylactic rule would be both uniform and easy to
apply. No party, whether prosecution or defense, white or Black,
would be able to peremptorily challenge African-American veni-
repersons once a court has determined that racial issues would
affect the trial. In the event of such a finding, Black jurors could
only be removed for cause.
This proposed remedy would further the Court's interest in
preserving the peremptory challenge in its traditional discretionary
form, while preventing its use as an instrument of racial harm. 267
The remedy proposed here would still permit the peremptory chal-
lenge to be freely exercised to remove any juror when race is not
implicated in the trial and any non-Black juror when race is a
factor. Consequently, a Black defendant would be free to peremp-
torily challenge white jurors for the purpose of increasing the
probability of Black participation on his or her jury.
Courts should broadly apply the test for whether there is a
significant likelihood that racial issues might affect a trial. When-
ever a Black defendant stands trial and there is possibility that
peremptory challenges by the prosecution could reduce the num-
ber of African-American jurors to a number less than three, it may
be presumed that racial issues would affect the trial. 268 This pre-
sumption would be irrebuttable, 269 although defendants could al-
2 See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
266 See discussions of Powers and McCollum, supra notes 155-234 and accompanying
text.
267 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99 (recognizing the importance of the peremptory
challenge, but insisting that "requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges ... furthers the ends of justice").
26 This presumption would be based on those studies which have demonstrated that
Black defendants stand a reduced chance of a fair trial when less than three African-
Americans are seated on the jury. See supra sources cited at note 237.
69 To make the presumption rebuttable would fly in the face of all that experience and
research has demonstrated about the nature of racial prejudice. The underrepresentation
of African-Americans on juries can cause harm to Black defendants even if there are no
other racial issues involved in the case.
1993]
116 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 28
ways waive their Equal Protection Clause rights with respect to
the selection of their juries270 and the prosecution could challenge
for cause when potential Black venirepersons demonstrated racial
bias during voir dire.
When a white defendant is standing trial, there would be no
presumption that racial issues would affect the trial. For the pros-
ecution to be prevented from using its peremptory challenges to
exclude African-American jurors, the trial of the white defendant
would have to be related in some way to the subjugation of African-
Americans due to their race. Upon such a finding, however, neither
the prosecution nor the defense could use their peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude potential Black jurors from the trial jury.271
Racial issues might affect the trial of a white defendant in a
number of ways.272 The Powers Court, for example, noted how
"cynicism" as to the integrity of the verdict may be increased
when Blacks are excluded from the jury:
The cynicism may be aggravated if race is implicated in
the trial, either in a direct way as with an alleged racial
motivation of the defendant or a victim, or in some subtle
manner as by casting doubt upon the credibility or dignity
of a witness, or even upon the standing or due regard of
an attorney who appears in the cause. 273
In circumstances such as these, Courts should not permit parties
to peremptorily challenge potential Black jurors.
270 Defendants may wish to waive their Equal Protection rights and permit the prose-
cution to use its peremptory challenges against Black jurors in order to exclude Black
jurors themselves, to expedite their trials or to curry favor with the prosecution or the
court. Any such waiver, however, should be made in accordance with the "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" standard of Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
27 This method of protecting the equal protection rights of Black jurors might seem
unfair to white defendants, since the prosecution would be free to strike white jurors while
the white defendant would be unable to strike Black jurors. One should remember, however,
that the purpose of the restriction on strikes against Black jurors is to prevent every Black
juror (or all but a few) from being removed from the venire. So long as a majority of thejurors on the venire are white, there would be no comparable fairness problem regarding
the interests of the white juror. However, a white defendant who was in danger of being
tried before a jury with less than three white jurors might have a legitimate argument that
the peremptory challenge of white jurors should be suspended, if racial issues permeated
his or her trial.
272 As a general rule, racial issues would affect a white defendant's case whenever the
defendant was perceived to be identified with Black persons or causes. See Underwood,
Race Discrimination in Jury Selection, supra note 99, at n.51 and accompanying text.
23 Powers, Ill S. Ct. at 1371.
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The McCollum facts provide another good illustration of rel-
evant facts to consider in a case involving white defendants where
racial issues might affect the trial. The crime in that case allegedly
was racially motivated, and a leaflet calling for a boycott of the
defendant's business was circulated in the African-American com-
munity.274 The Rodney King case, of course, provides a particu-
larly striking example in which racial issues were implicated in the
trial of white defendants.
Requiring white access to Equal Protection remedies to be
considered in relation to Black subjugation prevents the Supreme
Court's pre-Powers jury selection cases from being bleached of all
meaning. 275 The remedy proposed here recognizes the unique po-
sition of African-American citizens as victims of longstanding and
persistent racial oppression.
Conclusion
At first glance, the Supreme Court's decisions in Powers v.
Ohio and Georgia v. McCollum appear to make progress toward
eliminating abuse of the judicial system, but there is a hidden and
ultimately fatal flaw in the Court's approach. The Court views the
problem as a simple question of "discrimination" in its most narrow
sense. Thus, in the view of the Court, as long as Black and white
defendants and Black and white jurors receive identical rights and
privileges, the jury selection problem disappears. This approach
not only fails to resolve the problem, but actually makes it worse.
The use of colorblind principles to govern the ability of criminal
defendants to affect the use of peremptory challenges masks the
continuing racial oppression that Black defendants face and pre-
vents those defendants from doing anything about it.
The key to resolving the problem of race discrimination in the
jury selection process is to recognize it for what it is-one mani-
festation of a pervasive and persistent racial subjugation targeting
24 See discussion of McCollum, supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
2 Strangely, the Powers Court dismisses this argument, explaining weakly that just
because "the race of the defendant may be relevant to discerning bias in some cases does
not mean that it will be a factor in others, for race prejudice stems from various causes
and may manifest itself in different forms." 111 S. Ct. at 1374. The truth of this statement
proves nothing. There is no reason why white defendants cannot be required to show the
influence of race discrimination on their case, even if the nature of the proof will vary
depending on the facts of the case.
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African-Americans. 276 Ending race discrimination in the selection
of juries calls for an explicitly color-conscious remedy governing
the use of peremptory challenge: a blanket prohibition on the
exclusion of African-American venirepersons when race is impli-
cated in the trial.
The solution offered here is far from perfect. Even in a crim-
inal justice system that is not "colorblind" to the oppression of
African-Americans, future Rodney Kings may still be beaten, ar-
rested, tried and convicted on the basis of their race. If there are
no Blacks on the venire to begin with, and if racial attitudes remain
polarized, then the ability to retain African-American jurors and
exclude obvious racists will have little meaning. But until we reach
that brighter day when, in fact, each of us is judged by the "content
of our character," race-conscious remedies provide perhaps the
best hope for curtailing the use of the criminal justice system as a
tool for racial injustice.
276 This racial subjugation has not escaped judicial attention. Consider, for example,
the following observation:
[W]e... cannot deny that, 114 years after the close of the war between the States
and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and other forms of discrimination still
remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our society as a whole.
Perhaps today that discrimination takes a form more subtle than before. But it is
not less real or pernicious.
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1979) (Blackmun, J.).
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